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CONSTITUTIONAL TORTS AND THE
NEW MEXICO TORTS CLAIMS ACT
RUTH L. KOVNAT*

I. INTRODUCTION

When an employee of a governmental entity causes harm to an individual, compensation in damages is sometimes the only appropriate remedy to redress the injury. A police officer may unnecessarily or excessively
beat a person during an arrest. An inmate in a jail may physically attack
a fellow inmate because of the negligence of a jailer, or a guard may
deny a prisoner access to medical treatment.' In such cases, the victim
can be made whole only if the actor responsible for the harm, or his
employer, can be made to pay compensation. Victims of torts should be
entitled to recover compensatory damages under such circumstances,
whether or not the person who committed the tort is on the public payroll.
Such a recovery would serve both private and public interests. The
victim would be compensated and official misconduct would be deterred.
Further, imposition of liability would satisfy the ideal of providing equal
justice for persons similarly situated.
Despite the virtues of treating misconduct by public officials and misconduct by private parties in the same way, the doctrine of sovereign
immunity has often intervened to prevent this similarity of treatment.
Legislators have thought that exposure of public treasuries to the risks
of paying damages which ostensibly benefit only an individual, rather
than the public at large, to be so serious a problem that it outweighs the
importance of tort recovery for the victims of tortious conduct of government employees.' Some form of sovereign immunity to protect governmental entities against tort liability exists virtually everywhere in the
United States. 3 New Mexico, with its Tort Claims Act, 4 is no exception.
*Professor of Law, University of New Mexico School of Law.
1. See Methola v. County of Eddy, 95 N.M. 329, 622 P.2d 234 (1980).
2. Immunity doctrines do not flow exclusively from the need to protect public treasuries from
diversion to private judgments. Doctrines which immunize governmental officials are aimed at
protecting the goveming process itself. Governing requires countless decisions which often must be
made quickly and without the benefit of good information. Fear of personal liability for error might
cause officials to make decisions which are not in the best interests of the public. For the argument
that the present mix of immunity doctrines fails to perform optimally and for a proposed solution,
see Schuck, Suing Our Servants, 1980 Sup. Ct. Rev. 281.
3. Thirty-three states have abolished several areas of immunity by judicial decision. See Davis,
Administrative Law Treatise, § 25.00 (Supp. 1980).
4. N.M. Stat. Ann. §§41-4-1 to -29 (Repl. Pamp. 1982) (hereinafter sometimes referred to as
"the Act" or "the Tort Claims Act").
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The tension between the idea of making tort victims whole and that
of protecting public treasuries becomes particularly acute when the official
conduct not only breaches a duty imposed by the common law of tort,
but simultaneously deprives a victim of his constitutional rights. Although
a state legislature may have taken care to protect state treasuries against
tort judgments through the enactment of governmental immunity laws,
the public treasuries may nevertheless be exposed to such invasion by a
"civil rights" judgment pursuant to Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act. 5
in damages to vindicate depriSection 1983 furnishes a cause of action
6
vation of federal constitutional rights .
Two observations proceed from the recognition that the same conduct
may be the basis for both a tort action and a civil rights action against
the government. First, state efforts to protect their treasuries are undermined to the extent that federal law gives a right to damages for constitutional deprivations. Second, some confusion about the nature of the
federal civil rights action is inevitable. In fact, a prominent feature of
section 1983 litigation is the relationship between the federal remedy for
constitutional deprivations and state law remedies that redress tortious
conduct. That relationship is the general subject of this article.
Some have argued that virtually any time a public employee commits
a tort, a constitutional deprivation takes place and a section 1983 claim
is available. 7 On the other hand, governmental entities have argued that
the existence of a state tort remedy precludes a section 1983 claim; (1)
either because conduct which is unlawful as a matter of state tort law is
not "under color of law" within the meaning of section 1983,8 or (2)
because the state tort remedy supplies "due process," so that the loss,
whatever it is, does not amount to a constitutional deprivation. 9 Neither
of these extreme positions is, however, the law. Indeed, a doctrine appears
to be emerging which differentiates among three different sorts of federal
due process deprivations--each of which is redressable through section
1983 actions: denials of (1) incorporated rights, (2) substantive rights,
5. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976).
6. Section 1983 provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to
be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit
in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
7. In Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701 (1976), the United States Supreme Court rejected the
notion that § 1983 is a "font of tort law."
8. In Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961), the United States Supreme Court rejected this
argument.
9. See Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981); Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977).
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and (3) procedural rights. Further, the emerging view seems to recognize
that the impact of the availability of a state tort action on the section
1983 claim differs depending on whether the section 1983 claim is based
on a procedural deprivation, as distinguished from either a substantive
or incorporated right deprivation. The first part of this article will give
specific attention to a description and elaboration of this developing notion.
The Tort Claims Act governs the availability of the tort action in New
Mexico. Even though development of the doctrine that an available claim
under the state Act may in itself result in preclusion of a section 1983
claim arising out of the same conduct, it remains true that for at least
some kinds of section 1983 claims, the federal and New Mexico claims
coexist. The last section of this article concerns some of the issues which
emerge from the intersection of a section 1983 action and the New Mexico
State Tort Claims Act.
II. ACTIONABLE CONDUCT PURSUANT TO SECTION 1983
The relationship between state tort law (including its immunity law)
and an action under section 1983 is not simple. To begin to understand
that relationship, it is important to examine the extremes of a spectrum
of possibilities. The defendants' position in the famous case of Monroe
v. Pape"° is at one end. In Monroe, defendants contended that the availability of a remedy under state tort or state constitutional law totally
excluded the remedy afforded by section 1983. This argument relied on
the section 1983 requirement that the conduct giving rise to liability be
"under color of law." Under this argument, if the victim is able to obtain
a state law remedy, the defendant has necessarily acted contrary to state
law and therefore did not act under its "color." Only if the victim is
unable to obtain a judgment under state law would an allegation that the
defendants acted "under color of law" be proper within the meaning of
section 1983. The effect of this position is that an action under section
1983 is conditioned on the plaintiff's exhaustion of state judicial remedies." The United States Supreme Court rejected that proposition in
Monroe and concluded that section 1983 provides a federal remedy "supplementary to the state remedy, and the latter need not be first sought
and refused before the federal one is invoked." 2
10. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
11. This is distinct from the contention made in other cases that exhaustion of state administrative
remedies is a precondition to a § 1983 action. In Patsy v. Bd. of Regents, 50 U.S.L.W. 4731 (U.S.
June 21, 1982), the United States Supreme Court held that exhaustion of state administrative remedies
is not a condition precedent to filing a § 1983 action.
12. 365 U.S. at 183.
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In Paul v. Davis, 3 the United States Supreme Court rejected the other
extreme in the spectrum of possibilities. The plaintiff in Paul argued that
whenever a public official engages in conduct which is tortious under
state law, he necessarily has deprived a person of a right secured by the
federal Constitution, and therefore has engaged in conduct actionable
under section 1983. The Paul court rejected a reading of section 1983
which would make it a "font of tort law to be superimposed upon whatever
systems may already be administered by the States." "The Supreme Court's
rejection of these two extremes begins to focus the question. The inquiry
is not whether the availability of a state tort claim against a public official
precludes the availability of a constitutional claim based on the same
conduct. 5 Monroe and Paul indicate that a section 1983 action is neither
excluded nor guaranteed by the existence of state law governing the tort.
The problem becomes identification of the different sorts of section 1983
constitutional claims and deciding whether the availability of a state tort
remedy 6 has a different significance for the section 1983 7claim depending
on the kind of constitutional claim the plaintiff makes. '
A. Rights Incorporatedinto the Fourteenth Amendment
Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act is striking for its lack of substantive
provisions. Nowhere does the statute spell out the conduct for which it
provides a remedy. Therefore, in order to try to define that conduct, one
must look outside the statute. It is certain that section 1983 incorporates
the rights secured by the federal Constitution. 8 Because Congress clearly
enacted the statute to enforce the fourteenth amendment,' 9 it is there that
one must look to find what conduct gives rise to a claim under section
13. 424 U.S. 693 (1976).
14. Id. at 701.
15. It is not the author's intention to discuss judicial jurisdiction here. The assumption of this
section is that § 1983 claims, although federal, may be litigated in state court, and that state claims
arising out of the same factual setting as the § 1983 claims are properly within the pendent jurisdiction
of the federal court, Therefore, the discussion of the scope of the § 1983 claim is intended to apply
irrespective of the judicial forum in which it is litigated. See Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277
(1980).
16. A state tort remedy is not always available because of the operation of a state's immunity
law. See infra note 123 for text of The New Mexico Tort Claims Act.
17. The § 1983 action has advantages for the plaintiff. The Tort Claims Act limits liability, prohibits
an award of punitive damages, and provides no opportunity for attorney's fees for the prevailing
party. See infra note 123.
18. See Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600 (1979). Although violation of
rights secured by some federal statutes clearly amounts to claims under § 1983, this article is confined
to an examination of the constitutional claims under § 1983. See Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. I
(1980). Cf. Middlesex County Sewage Auth. v. Nat'l Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1 (1981).
19. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 was derived from § I of the Civil Rights Act of 1871. See 17 Stat. 13. For
an exhaustive reexamination of the legislative history of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, see Monell
v. New York City Dep't of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
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1983. The operative provision of the fourteenth amendment, 20 however,
does not much advance the inquiry. The first clause of section 1 of the
fourteenth amendment protects federal privileges and immunities from
state abridgement. The second clause protects life, liberty and property
from state deprivation without due process of law. The third clause guarantees equal protection of the laws.
Early judicial interpretation of the fourteenth amendment suggests that
at least with respect to the privileges and immunities clause, the amendment is largely devoid of meaning. 2' Therefore, in the area of federal
privileges and immunities there is little for section 1983 to protect. In
fact, it was not until the long process of Supreme Court decision-making
incorporated parts of the Bill of Rights into the due process clause that
section 1983 became a fruitful claim for someone injured by a person
acting under color of state law. 22 For example, a violation of the fourth
amendment now clearly gives rise to a section 1983 action. The reason
that Justice Douglas had no trouble finding that plaintiff had stated a claim
under section 1983 in Monroe v. Pape was that "the guarantee against
unreasonable searches and seizures contained in the Fourth Amendment
has been made applicable to the States23by reason of the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.'
20. The relevant provision provides:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.
21. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872). For an excellent examination of the
early development of the fourteenth amendment and civil rights legislation, see Gressman, The
Unhappy History of Civil Rights Legislation, 50 Mich. L. Rev. 1323 (1952). For the argument that
the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment
are natural rights and included, at a minimum, the right to contract, own, and dispose property, to
travel without restriction, and to have protection in the enjoyment of his personal security, personal
liberty and private property, see J. TenBrock, Equal Under Law (1965).
22. The Supreme Court has never held that the Bill of Rights was fully incorporated into the
fourteenth amendment. Rather, the Court has selectively incorporated various amendments and parts
of amendments. The due process clause of the fourteenth amendment limits the power of states and
protects individual freedom in the same way as the Bill of Rights limits the federal government with
respect to: the first amendment (freedom of speech, see, e.g., Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U.S. 380 (1927);
freedom of the press, see, e.g., Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931); freedom of assembly, De
Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937); freedom of petition, Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496 (1939);
free exercise of religion, Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940); non-establishment of
religion, Everson v. Bd. of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947)); the fourth amendment (freedom from
unreasonable searches and seizures, Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949)); the fifth amendment
(freedom from compulsory self-incrimination, Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964)); the sixth
amendment (freedom from double jeopardy, Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969); right to
counsel, Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); speedy trial, Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386
U.S. 213 (1967)); and the eighth amendment (freedom from cruel and unusual punishment, Robinson
v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962)).
23. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. at 171.
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One way, then, of stating a claim under section 1983 is to allege facts
constituting a deprivation of a right which has been incorporated into the
fourteenth amendment. Those rights form part of the substance that the
fourteenth amendment protects, but they by no means exhaust the due
process clause. In fact, the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment performs at least three functions. It is the clause which incorporates
most of the Bill of Rights and therefore limits the states just as the Bill
of Rights limits the federal government. 24 It protects persons from irrational or outrageous state governmental behavior (substantive due process). Further, it guarantees that states will afford certain procedural
safeguards when depriving persons of life, liberty or property (procedural
due process). Separate consideration of substantive and procedural due
process is warranted because it appears that where there is an available
state tort remedy the United States Supreme Court treats section 1983
claims based on substantive due process differently from those based on
procedural due process. It appears that a section 1983 claim based on a
denial of procedural due process may be precluded if there is an available
state tort remedy. If the section 1983 claim is based on a denial of
substantive due process, or a denial of incorporated rights, however, the
availability of a state remedy does not appear to affect the section 1983
claim.
B. Substantive Due Process
The due process clause of the fourteenth amendment protects individuals from substantial and arbitrary governmental impositions and restraints. The guarantee of liberty is not defined only in terms of the
freedoms expressly articulated in the Bill of Rights.25 The guarantee
extends to a general interest in freedom. With this understanding, the
Court has held that the due process clause protects various kinds of
freedom in a variety of situations. For example, the clause protects individuals from state interference in private family life, 6 and prohibits
24. This article will not discuss the "incorporation" rights in any depth. Insofar as § 1983 actions
are concerned, violations of "incorporation" rights are treated similarly to substantive due process
violations.
25. See Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 522-55 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting); see also Moore
v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
26. See, e.g., Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980), for the proposition that the " 'liberty'
protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment includes not only the freedoms
explicitly mentioned in the Bill of Rights, but also a freedom of personal choice in certain matters
of marriage and family life. This. . . includes the freedom of a woman to decide whether to terminate
a pregnancy." Id. at 312. See also Tribe, American Constitutional Law, 569-575 (1978), and Roe
v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (women's right to decide whether to terminate pregnancy); Eisenstadt
v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (right to use contraception); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967)
(freedom to marry person of another race).
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corporal punishment in public schools unrelated to any legitimate educational objective. 27 Courts have also held the due process clause prevents
involuntary civil commitment in mental health institutions without minimally adequate treatment,2 8 and prohibits the use of excessive force in
effecting arrests29 or in maintaining discipline in correctional facilities. 0
The courts appear to employ modem substantive due process analysis in
three main categories of cases.
1. The Personal Choice Cases
The first group of substantive due process cases are those in which the
challenge is to arbitrary governmental intrusion into an area of personal
choice deemed to be so private as to be entitled to be shielded from
regulation. This group includes cases involving abortion and contraception. 3 It is clear that the Supreme Court of the United States is most
comfortable when applying substantive due process to these private or
family decision-making cases,32 and is dubious about extending substantive due process outside this narrowly constrained circle.33
Nevertheless, it would be wrong to conclude that the sanctity of family
life is the only liberty protected by the modern notion of substantive due
process. Cases which involve freedom of choice concerning personal
appearance have also undergone substantive due process analysis. 34 In
27. See generally Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977); Hall v. Tawney, 621 F.2d 607 (4th
Cir. 1980).
28. Scott v. Plante, 641 F.2d 117 (3d Cir. 1981); Goodman v. Parwatikar, 570 F.2d 801 (8th Cir.
1978).
29. Jenkins v. Averett, 424 F.2d 1228 (4th Cir. 1970); cf. Melton v. Shivers, 496 F. Supp. 781
(M.D. Ala. 1980).
30. King v. Blankenship, 636 F.2d 70 (4th Cir. 1980); Meredith v. Arizona, 523 F.2d 484 (9th
Cir. 1975).
31. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
32. See Harrah Indep. School Dist. v. Martin, 440 U.S. 194 (1979), in which the Supreme Court
observed that the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment protects substantive aspects of
liberty against impermissible governmental restrictions, and appeared to recognize that claim when
the interest resembled "freedom of choice with respect to certain basic matters of procreation,
marriage, and family life." Id. at 198.
33. In Harrah, id., the Court upheld the action of the school board and reversed the Tenth Circuit
which had found the school board's failure to renew a teacher's contract arbitrary and therefore in
violation of the due process clause. The Court noted that the official action challenged did not
encroach into the sanctity of family life. The Court's reluctance to analyze questions in terms of
substantive due process undoubtedly stems from the criticism the early Court received when it
reviewed economic legislation in terms of substantive due process. The notion of due process enforced
by the Court under the old substantive due process analysis guaranteed free trade and prohibited
economic regulation, in contradiction to legislative aims. See. e.g., Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S.
251 (1918); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
34. See Hander v. San Jacinto Junior College, 519 F.2d 273 (5th Cir. 1975) (faculty members'
facial hair may be regulated only when regulation has some relevance to legitimate administrative
or educational functions). Cf. Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238 (1976) (police officer may be required
to comply with hair length regulation because rational to determine discipline, uniformity and esprit
de corps of civilian police group).
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Kelley v. Johnson, Is a case involving the validity of a hair-length regulation, the Court described the constitutional issue as the determination
of whether the regulation is so irrational that it may be branded arbitrary
and therefore a deprivation of a liberty interest in freedom to choose a
hairstyle.3 6 In Ingraham v. Wright, 7 the Court treated the question of
substantive due process as if it were distinct from incorporated rights or
procedural due process. In Ingraham, school children who had been
subjected to corporal punishment petitioned the Court to decide whether
the defendants' conduct amounted to a due process deprivation. The Court
granted the school children's petition to decide whether disciplinary corporal punishment violates the eighth amendment prohibiting cruel and
unusual punishment38 and whether the procedural requirements of the
fourteenth amendment require a hearing before the imposition of corporal
punishment.39 The Court denied review of the substantive due process
question presented in the petition for certiorari which asked: "Is the
infliction of severe corporal punishment upon public school students arbitrary, capricious and unrelated to achieving any legitimate educational
purpose and therefore violative of the Due Process Clause of the fourteenth
amendment?" 4 ° The separate treatment of the question supports the notion
that substantive due process restraints on governmental behavior exist
outside of the narrow sphere of personal choice cases.
2. The Physical Integrity Cases
A second group of modern due process cases illustrates the idea that
substantive due process is distinct from both incorporated due process
rights and procedural due process rights. In these cases, the substantive
due process strand of the fourteenth amendment prohibits unjustified
violations of physical integrity by government officials. Arbitrariness of
government conduct is the hallmark of the constitutional claim. When a
police officer shoots an arrestee without a reasonable apprehension that
his own life is in danger, the officer has violated the substantive due
35. 425 U.S. 238 (1976).
36. Id.at 248.
37. 430 U.S, 651 (1977).
38. The Court decided that the eighth amendment did not apply to school disciplinary practice.
Id. at 671.
39. The Court found the existing procedural safeguards to be adequate. Id. at 682. See infra text
accompanying notes 69-73.
40. 430 U.S. at 659. See Hall v. Tawney, 621 F.2d 607 (4th Cir. 1980). In Hall, the Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeals read Ingraham to recognize that state action might infringe a liberty not
incorporated into the fourteenth amendment, and may also at the same time satisfy procedural
requirements and yet be so arbitrary as to violate the substantive due process strand of the fourteenth
amendment.
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process clause of the fourteenth amendment. 4 Similarly, when a police
officer twists a person's arm, strikes him in the ribs and detains him for
five to ten minutes and then releases him without undertaking formal
arrest procedures, the officer has violated the substantive due process
clause.a 2The substantive due process clause of the fourteenth amendment
prohibits the use of force in the prison setting unless there is a showing
of need to maintain or restore discipline.43 Therefore, when the chairman
of a prison disciplinary committee informs a prisoner that disciplinary
charges have been dropped, but then throws the inmate to the floor and
pulls his beard out of his cheek, the chairman has violated the fourteenth
amendment."
The same notion of arbitrariness runs through the cases which recognize
that the government must respect the physical integrity of persons involuntarily committed to mental health or mental retardation facilities.
In Romeo v. Youngberg,45 the Third Circuit recognized "those aspects of
personal autonomy recognized from the time of Blackstone-the power
of locomotion without restraint and the right to personal security-as well
46
as the right to freedom from punishment, require continued respect."
The government can only incarcerate a profoundly mentally retarded
individual who is not dangerous to others for the purpose of protection
and treatment. Incarceration without such protection and treatment is
arbitrary confinement, even if procedural safeguards required by the procedural due process aspect of the fourteenth amendment accompany the
initial confinement. Accordingly, in Romeo, the court approved a jury
instruction that shackling of such an individual "may be justified only
by a compelling necessity, i.e., that the shackling was essential to protect
the patient or treat him" 47 or in the alternative, that shackling was the
least restrictive method of dealing with the patient. Although the United
States Supreme Court did not agree with the precise standard articulated
by the Third Circuit for finding an infringement of rights, it clearly agreed
41. Jenkins v. Averette, 424 F.2d 1228 (4th Cir. 1970). There may be an overlap between this
notion and the idea that fourth amendment protection is incorporated into the fourteenth amendment.
See also White v. Rochford, 592 F.2d 381 (7th Cir. 1979); Stringer v. Dilger, 313 F.2d 536 (10th
Cir. 1963). Cf. Melton v. Shivers, 496 F. Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala. 1980).
42. See Bellows v. Dainack, 555 F.2d 1105 (2d Cir. 1977).
43. King v. Blankenship, 636 F.2d 70 (4th Cir. 1980).
44. Id.
45. 644 F.2d 147 (3d Cir. 1980), vacated, Youngberg v. Romeo, 50 U.S.L.W. 4681 (U.S. June
15, 1982).
46. 644 F2d at 157.
47. Id. at 160. The court also dealt with the question of relationship between state tort law
(malpractice claims) and constitutional claims. The court concluded that the existence of treatment
issues in a claim of constitutional infringement does not transform the claim into a malpractice
action. Id. at 157.
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that the source of the rights of an involuntarily confined retarded individual
is the substantive due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. 48
In Rennie v. Klein49 the Third Circuit Court of Appeals recognized the
right of involuntarily committed mentally ill patients to refuse administration of anti-psychotic drugs unless reasonable treatment alternatives
had been ruled out." The Eighth Circuit has also held that mentally
retarded persons judicially committed to state institutions have a constitutional right to treatment." The same circuit also held that the state has
a duty to provide a humane living environment which includes a duty to
protect inmates from assault by fellow inmates and staff; and if the state
callously disregards its duty, that disregard may constitute a violation of
civil rights.5
3. The "Shocks the Conscience" Cases
The third line of cases which fall within the substantive due process
category of constitutional deprivation began with Rochin v. California.3
In Rochin, the Supreme Court described due process of law as "a summarized constitutional guarantee of respect for those personal immunities
which .. .are so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people
as to be ranked as fundamental." 54 Rochin involved the validity of a drug
possession conviction based on evidence acquired by forcefully inducing
48. The Court stated:
In deciding this case, we have weighed those post-commitment interests cognizable as liberty interests under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment against legitimate state interests and in light of the constraints under which
most state institutions necessarily operate. We repeat that the state concedes a
duty to provide adequate food, shelter, clothing and medical care. These are the
essentials of the care that the state must provide. The state also has the unquestioned duty to provide reasonable safety for all residents and personnel within the
institution. And it may not restrain residents except when and to the extent
professional judgment deems this necessary to assure such safety or to provide
needed training. In this case, therefore, the state is under a duty to provide
respondent with such training as an appropriate professional would consider reasonable to ensure his safety and to facilitate his ability to function free from
bodily restraints. It may well be unreasonable not to provide training when training
could significantly reduce the need for restraints or the likelihood of violence.
Youngberg v. Romeo, 50 U.S.L.W. 4681, 4685 (U.S. June 15, 1982).
49. 653 F.2d 836 (3d Cir. 1981).
50. See also Mills v. Rogers, 50 U.S.L.W. 4676 (U.S. June 18, 1982). In this case, the principal
question on which the Supreme Court granted certiorari was whether an involuntarily committed
mental patient has a constitutional right to refuse treatment with anti-psychotic drugs. It declined to
answer the question, however, because of uncertainty about a question of state law. It vacated the
judgment of the First Circuit Court of Appeals.
51. Welsch v. Likins, 550 F.2d 1122 (8th Cir. 1977).
52. Goodman v. Parwatikar, 570 F.2d 801 (8th Cir. 1978).
53. 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
54. Id. at 169.

Winter 1983]

CONSTITUTIONAL TORTS

the suspect to vomit. The court concluded that more than some "fastidious
squeamishness" was offended: "This is conduct that shocks the conscience." 55 In a later case involving the alleged unprovoked attack of a
prison inmate by a guard, 5 6 Judge Friendly of the Second Circuit concluded that Rochin stood for
the proposition that, quite apart from any specific of the Bill of
Rights, application of undue force by law enforcement officials deprives a suspect of liberty without due process of law. . . . The same
principle should extend to acts of brutality by correctional officials,
although the notion of what constitutes brutality may not necessarily
be the same. 57
In White v. Rochfordj 8 the Seventh Circuit applied the Rochin definition
to a substantive due process claim against a police officer who arrested
an adult driver for drag racing and left three children who had been in
the arrestee's care abandoned on the side of the road. The Rochford
plaintiffs alleged that the children suffered mental pain and anguish and
that one child, a five-year old asthmatic, had to be hospitalized. The
court concluded that abandoning the children and leaving them to the
dangers of traffic and cold was "conduct so clearly deserving of universal
reprobation," 59 that it was difficult to understand how it could fall outside
of the protections of the due process clause. Similarly, in Salinas v. Breier,
strip and body searches of the wife and young children of a person arrested
for transporting heroin "shocked the conscience. "I The degrading and
humiliating searches could not be justified even if the "arrest" of the
family of the suspected drug dealer were legal. 6 The court found that
the plaintiff had stated a constitutional claim.
These three strands of substantive due process do not exclude each
other. There is undoubtedly substantial overlap between the notions of
freedom of private decision-making from governmental control, freedom
55. Id. at 172.
56. Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028 (2d Cir. 1973).
57. Id. at 1032.
58. 592 F.2d 381 (7th Cir. 1979).
59. Id. at 386.
60. 517 F. Supp. 1272, 1275 (E.D. Wis. 1981). In Johnson v. Glick, supra note 56, Judge
Friendly acknowledged the difficulty of applying the "shocks the conscience" standard. He recognized
that state tort law may provide a remedy for every unconsented touching, but all of these do not
amount to a deprivation of substantive due process. To determine whether the constitutional line has
been crossed, Judge Friendly would look to such factors as need for force, relationship between the
need and the amount of force, the extent of injury inflicted, and whether force was applied in a
good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically for the purpose of
inflicting harm. 481 F.2d at 1033.
61. 517 F. Supp. at 1275.
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from arbitrary intrusions into personal and physical integrity, and freedom
from governmental conduct which shocks the conscience. Indeed, there
is overlap between these concepts and protection of liberties incorporated
into the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. The important
point for the purposes of this article is that these sorts of violations of
"substantive due process" are at the core of the rights which are secured
by the Constitution of the United States and thus comprise the sort of
conduct which gives rise to actions for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.62
C. ProceduralDue Process
A denial of procedural due process is also a proper section 1983 claim.
Much has been written about procedural safeguards required by the fourteenth amendment, 63 and it is not the purpose of this article to review the
development of the doctrine. It is sufficient to say that, at a minimum,
this aspect of the fourteenth amendment requires that there shall be notice
and opportunity for a hearing when there is a grievous governmental
deprivation of life, liberty or property. The kinds of interests recognized
as liberty or property interests may be open to question,' 4 and the timing
and kind of process considered to be "due" 65 in order to satisfy the
fourteenth amendment may vary. The fundamental notion, however, is
that "no better instrument has been devised for arriving at truth than to
give a person in jeopardy of serious loss notice of the case against him
and opportunity to meet it." 66 It is clear that deprivations of life, liberty
or property without procedural due process constitute a deprivation of
rights which is redressable by a claim for damages under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983.67
62. It is worth stating here, even though the point is elaborated later, that conduct amounting to
violations of the substantive due process strand of the fourteenth amendment are generally those
that cannot, as a practical matter, be cured or prevented by procedural safeguards: the unprovoked
attack of an inmate by a guard or strip searching of children. On the other hand, certain procedural
safeguards may prevent the governmental action from being the arbitrary kind prohibited by the
substantive due process branch of the fourteenth amendment. For example, in Rennie v. Klein, 653
F.2d 836 (3d Cir. 1981), the Third Circuit approved a range of procedures designed to assure that
administration of anti-psychotic drugs to an unwilling, institutionalized patient was based on an
exercise of professional judgment, and was therefore not arbitrary. Id. at 850.
63. See generally Tribe, American Constitutional Law 501-563 (1978); Glennon, Constitutional
Liberty and Property: Federal Common Law and Section 1983, 51 S. Cal. L. Rev. 355 (1978);
Kadish, Methodology and Criteria in Due Process Adjudication-A Survey and Criticism, 66 Yale
L.J. 319 (1957).
64. The Court has expressly recognized several liberty and property interests: Perry v. Sindermann,
408 U.S. 593 (1972) (implied tenure); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (welfare benefits);
Willner v. Committee on Character and Fitness, 373 U.S. 96 (1963) (admission to bar). But see
Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976) (reputation is neither a property or liberty interest).
65. See Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976); Amett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974).
66. Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 171-72 (1951) (Frankfurter,
J., concurring).
67. See, e.g., Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622 (1980); Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S.
247 (1978).
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The interesting issue for purposes of this article is whether the availability of a civil action under state law automatically supplies the procedural safeguards required by this branch of the fourteenth amendment.
If so, we have reached a partial answer to the problem initially posed.
In the case where a state tort claim is available and the section 1983
claim is based on governmental conduct which denies procedural safeguards to an individual, defendants would argue that the conduct does
not amount to a constitutional deprivation. Because state law provides
redress, even though it comes after the deprivation, procedural due process is afforded, If there is a state remedy, there is no denial of procedural
due process and thus, no claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.68 The
consequence of the acceptance of this argument is that, at least with
regard to claims of denial of procedural due process, a valid tort claim
under state law excludes a section 1983 action. The practical importance
of such a result cannot be overstated. If a state tort claim can exclude a
section 1983 claim, state legislatures will gain more control over their
treasuries. Attorneys' fees and punitive damages may be limited as a
matter of state law. Limitations on liability may be imposed. None of
the limits exist in the present section 1983 action.
1. The Ingraham/ParrattPrinciple
The ramifications of the procedural due process question can best be
explored through an examination of two recent United States Supreme
Court decisions, Ingraham v. Wright69 and Parrattv. Taylor.7" Ingraham
supports the proposition that a valid state tort claim excludes a section
1983 action. The case involved a section 1983 action for damages against
teachers who had inflicted disciplinary corporal punishment on junior
high school students. In considering whether defendants' conduct involved a deprivation of procedural due process, the Supreme Court undertook a two-stage analysis. First the Court considered whether the
interests asserted by the individuals were encompassed within the fourteenth amendment protection of life, liberty or property. Second, the Court
looked to what procedures constitute due process of law. The Court
concluded that corporal punishment in public schools does implicate a
constitutionally protected liberty interest, but that traditional commonlaw remedies are fully adequate to afford procedural due process. Accordingly, the Court found that no constitutional right had been denied,
68. This is distinct from, but certainly a relative of, the argument posed by defendants in Monroe
v. Pape. See supra text accompanying notes 8-12.
69. 430 U.S. 651 (1977). For a discussion of the substantive due process aspects of this case,
see supra text accompanying notes 37-40.
70. 451 U.S. 527 (1981).
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and that no claim had been stated under section 1983."' The Court reasoned that no advance procedural safeguards were needed because "reasonable discipline" is privileged under common law and that Florida law
provided an action for damages if the privilege were abused.72 The Court
believed that the cost of an administrative procedure prior to the administration of discipline outweighed the benefit of an additional safeguard
to the affected individual. The state tort law action for damages, which
would be brought after the deprivation, provided sufficient due process
to exclude a section 1983 claim.
Justice White, joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall and Stevens, dissented from Justice Powell's majority decision. The dissenters would
have allowed the section 1983 claim and thought civil remedies under
state tort law were inadequate for two reasons. First, the state law remedy
could not protect against a good faith mistake of disciplinarians.7 3 Second,
the dissenters did not agree that a remedy available after the punishment
Was sufficient to satisfy procedural due process requirements. They reasoned that the very purpose of a prior hearing is precisely to prevent
deprivation based on mistaken facts. A post-deprivation hearing could
not serve this purpose. More important, the dissenters believed that,
although it might be feasible to compensate persons for deprivations of
property wrongfully taken through post-deprivation procedures, infliction
of physical pain is final and irreparable. It cannot be undone in a subsequent proceeding, and thus a post-deprivation state remedy could not
supply the process that is required by the fourteenth amendment.
In spite of the misgivings of the dissenters in Ingraham, the notion
remained that the availability of state civil remedies subsequent to a
deprivation is sufficient procedural due process and thus prevents the
individual who has suffered the loss from stating a constitutional claim
for damages pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Court elaborated this
view in Parrattv. Taylor.74
71. Recall that the Court did not consider whether punishment involved in this case constitutes
a denial of substantive due process. It denied the petition for certiorari on that question. See supra
text accompanying notes 37-40.
72. The Court used the balancing approach announced in Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319
(1976), in reaching these conclusions. 430 U.S. at 682. That approach is:
[D]ue process generally requires consideration of three distinct factors: First, the
private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an
erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally,
the Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and
administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement
would entail.
424 U.S. at 335.
73. 430 U.S. at 693-94. Good faith was a defense to the tort action under Florida law.
74. 451 U.S. 527 (1981).
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Parratt involved the claim of an inmate at a Nebraska prison who
ordered hobby materials worth $23.50. He claimed that prison officials
negligently lost his property 7" and that this conduct deprived him of rights
secured by the fourteenth amendment. Therefore he claimed that he was
entitled to relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Nebraska had a tort claims
procedure which provided a remedy to persons who suffered losses through
torts of the state's employees. The Court explained that in any section
1983 action, the initial inquiry must focus on whether the conduct was
committed under color of state law, and whether the conduct deprived a
person of rights, privileges, and immunities secured by the Constitution
or laws76 of the United States.
In analyzing the inmate's constitutional claim, the Court separated
procedural due process claims from those claims arising out of the fourteenth amendment "incorporated rights" doctrine. The Court noted that
Parratt was not asserting any right held to be applicable against the states
by virtue of incorporation into the fourteenth amendment. The Court
concluded that the plaintiff's constitutional claim amounted to a deprivation of property without the procedural safeguards necessary to satisfy
the fourteenth amendment. The Court did not address the possibility that
the plaintiff's claim fell within the77 cases which have been held to be a
denial of substantive due process.
After characterizing the constitutional claim as a procedural due process
claim, the Court proceeded to decide whether the inmate had made out
his claim.
Unquestionably, respondent's claim satisfies three prerequisites of a
valid due process claim: the petitioners acted under color of state
law; the hobby kit falls within the definition of property; and the
alleged loss, even though negligently caused, amounted to a deprivation.78
However, the Court continued, the fourteenth amendment protects only
against deprivations without due process of law. To determine whether
plaintiff's deprivation was without due process, the Court considered
whether Nebraska's tort remedies as redress for property deprivations
satisfied the requirements of procedural due process. The Court concluded
75. The question of whether negligence is a basis for § 1983 liability has split the circuits. This
issue is addressed infra at text accompanying notes 149-177. See also Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S.
137 (1979); Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555 (1978).
76. See Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1 (1980). But see Middlesex County Sewage Auth. v.
Nat'l Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1 (1981).
77. The conduct of the prison officials, negligent handling of inmate's property, neither arbitrarily
intruded on personal integrity, or areas of private decision-making, nor does it "shock the conscience."
The conduct simply does not fit into the substantive due process mold.
78. 451 U.S. at 536.
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that the "fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to
be heard and it is an opportunity which must be granted at a meaningful
time and in a meaningful manner." 79 As in Ingraham, the ParrattCourt
noted that procedural due process does not always require a hearing prior
to the initial deprivation of property. When property is lost through the
random and unauthorized act of a state employee, 80 a pre-loss hearing is
impossible as a practical matter. The Court ruled that the Nebraska tort
claims procedures were adequate to satisfy due process, even though not
all the relief available under section 1983, i.e., punitive damages and a
jury trial, are available under the Nebraska procedure.
Although the concurring justices in Parrattsuggested misgivings with
and limitations to the opinion"' a principle emerges from the case. Negligent conduct of state officials resulting in the deprivation of an individual's property clearly does not state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983if there is an available procedure for redress under state law. This is so
even though the remedy under state law is not as complete as it might
be under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.82
Parrattand Ingraham, taken together, may bar section 1983 actions
in procedural due process cases whenever there is a state remedy. Parratt
makes it clear that an adequate state procedure bars section 1983 actions
where the deprivation of property was negligent. Ingraham can be understood to establish the principle that even intentionally caused liberty
deprivations do not state a claim under section 1983 if state tort claims
79. Id. at 540.
80. This is reminiscent of the defendants' argument in Monroe v. Pape. See supra text accompanying notes 8-12.
81. A number of separate concurring opinions in Parratthighlight the questions left open by the
Opinion of the Court. Justice Stewart doubted that negligently caused property loss is a deprivation
of property within the meaning of the fourteenth amendment. In his view, to so hold would trivialize
the guarantee of the amendment. 451 U.S. at 545. Justice Blackmun concurred in the judgment but
emphasized its narrow reach. He did not read the Court's opinion as applicable to a case concerning
deprivation of life or liberty, nor to a cause involving denials of substantive due process. He continued
"to believe that there are certain governmental actions that, even if undertaken with a full panoply
of procedural protections are, in and of themselves, antithetical to fundamental notions of due
process." Id. at 545. Furthermore, Justice Blackmun believed that in the majority of cases of
"intentional" (as distinguished from negligent) deprivation of property, procedural due process would
require pre-deprivation hearings. Id. at 545-46.
Justice Powell concurred only in the result. He believed that negligent acts of state officials causing
property losses do not amount to a deprivation of property within the meaning of the fourteenth
amendment. Instead, § 1983 was limited to redress for intentional acts. Justice Powell was also
disturbed by the implication in the Court's opinion that only procedural rights are created by the
due process clause. He believed the due process clause includes substantive limitations on state
actions and that in certain cases, these limitations apply even where compensation is available under
state law. Id. at 552-53.
82. Even Justice Marshall, who dissented in part, agreed that the state remedies were sufficient
to satisfy the requirements of due process even though they would not have afforded plaintiff all the
relief that would have been available in a § 1983 action. Id. at 554-55.
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are available against the defendants.8 3 Justice Stevens seemed to have
something like this in mind in his dissent in Ingraham.84 After Parratt
and Ingraham, it appears that a section 1983 claim based on a deprivation
of procedural due process will be rare, because most states provide some
state tort remedies. 85
Parratthas already influenced the lower federal courts, which have
given it a broad application. In Peery v. Davis,86 the court dismissed a
prisoner's section 1983 claim which alleged that he had suffered physical
injury as a result of defendant's negligence in failing to supply him with
safety glasses. The court concluded after a review of Supreme Court
precedent that tort claims are consistently dismissed where state remedies
are available. 87 In Rutledge v. Arizona Board of Regents,88 the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that the plaintiff failed to state a
section 1983 claim by alleging, among other things, conduct of a university football coach which amounted to assault and battery. That court
had previously held that an unprovoked assault and battery by a guard
in a prison stated a claim under section 1983.89 The Ninth Circuit Court
had, however, left open the question whether less reprehensible conduct
would suffice to state a section 1983 claim. In light of Parratt,the court
now believed it unnecessary to pursue the issue. Even assuming that
assault and battery implicated a liberty interest, plaintiff had tort remedies
available under Arizona law. Therefore, the court believed, Parrattrequired a dismissal. "That the effect of our holding is to relegate appellant
to his tort law remedy under Arizona law for Kush's assault and battery
should surprise no one. That is the consequence of Parrattv. Taylor as
applied to this action of Kush.'90
83. It appears that The New Mexico Tort Claims Act immunizes public school teachers and their
employers from liability precisely in the Ingraham setting. See Garcia v. Albuquerque Pub. Schools,
95 N.M. 391, 622 P.2d 699 (1980). Thus, even if Ingraham stands for the broad proposition stated
in the text, the immunity provided under The New Mexico Tort Claims Act deprives plaintiffs of a
state tort remedy against either the governmental entity or the individual defendants, and presumably
the § 1983 claim is available.
84. 430 U.S. at 701-702 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
85. One commentator has suggested that even claims brought under the equal protection clause
of the fourteenth amendment might feel the impact of the Parratt analysis. See Kirby, Demoting
FourteenthAmendment Claims to State Torts, 68 A.B.A. J. 166 (1982).
86. 524 F Supp. 107 (E.D.Va. 1981).
87. The court relied
on Baker v.McCollan, 443 U.S. 137 (1979), and Paul v.Davis, 424 U.S.
693 (1976), as well as on Parratt v.Taylor. 524 F.Supp. at 108.
88, 660 F.2d 1345 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. granted sub nom. Kush v.Rutledge, 50 U.S.L.W.
3998.27 (U.S.July 2, 1982) (No.81-1675).
89. Meredith v.Arizona, 523 F.2d 481 (9th Cir. 1975).
Parratt
90. 660 F.2d at1352. There isnothing surprising about this
result.
The problem isthat
seems to have encouraged the Ninth Circuit to foreshorten the inquiry as to what kind of due process
claim is presented, just as Justice Powell predicted in his concurrence in Parratt. The facts of the
Rutledge case, however, do make it clear that the only kind of due process conceivably involved is
procedural due process.
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In Meshkov v. Abington Township,9 plaintiff alleged that police officers
who had been called to revive his son did. so, but then took the son to
the police station and placed him in a cell where he could not be observed
(and which contained bedsheets) even though he had threatened suicide
and even though there was a hospital directly across the street from the
station. Plaintiff's decedent hanged himself with the bed sheets in the
cell and attempts to resuscitate him were unsuccessful. He died after
nearly two months in a coma. The court granted defendant's motion to
dismiss, apparently reasoning that the negligence of the police officers
did not rise to the level of a constitutional claim. The court also applied
Justice Rehnquist's reasoning in Parrattto conclude that allegations of
negligent deprivation of "life" did not state a claim under section 1983,
because the plaintiff had a state court action and could proceed to prosecute
his negligence claims in that forum.
Courts have also invoked Parrattin cases involving negligent deprivations of property by state officers. In Engblom v. Carey,9 2 striking state
prison correction officials sustained personal property damage allegedly
caused by the negligence of National Guard personnel brought in to carry
out the strikers' duties. The court held that because plaintiffs had failed
to pursue a state remedy, they could not be said to have suffered deprivation of property under color of state law without due process of law.
At least one court, however, declined to extend the logic of either Parratt
or Ingraham to a case where property was intentionally destroyed by
state officers. In Tarkowski v. Hoogasian,93 the court distinguished intentional conduct from negligence and recognized a section 1983 claim
based on such allegations of intentional conduct, even though a tort
remedy was available under state law.
The Fifth Circuit considered the implications of Parrattin an entirely
different setting. In Duncan v. Poythress,94 Georgia voters brought a
section 1983 action to challenge state officials' appointment of a judge
to fill a vacancy rather than holding a special election as required by
Georgia law. The state officials argued that even if the appointment illegally disenfranchised the Georgia electorate, the violation of state law
does not rise to the level of a constitutional deprivation. The Fifth, Seventh
and Eighth and Second Circuits 95 had held that not every election irreg91. 517 F. Supp. 1280 (E.D. Pa. 1981).
92. 522 F. Supp. 57 (S.D. N.Y. 1981). See also Sheppard v. Moore, 514 F. Supp. 1372 (M.D.
N.C. 1981); Parker v. Rockefeller, 521 F. Supp. 1013 (N.D. W. Va. 1981).
93. 50 U.S.L.W. 2518 (N.D. II1. Feb. 19, 1982).
94. 657 F.2d 691 (5th Cir. 1981).
95. See Gamza v. Aguirre, 619 F.2d 449 (5th Cir. 1980); Hennings v. Grafton, 523 F.2d 861
(7th Cir. 1975); Pettengill v. R-I School Dist., 472 F.2d 121 (8th Cir. 1973); Powell v. Powell, 436
F.2d 84 (2d Cir. 1970).
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ularity amounts to a constitutional deprivation. The Duncan court, however, concluded that where the particular conduct is part of a pattern to
erode democratic processes, or if the election process reaches the point
of patent and fundamental unfairness, a violation of the due process clause
may be indicated and relief under section 1983 may be in order.
The Duncan court rejected defendants' reliance on Parratt.The Court
recognized that:
Parrattconcerned procedural due process rather than substantive due
process. The Parrattcourt was not required to define the limits of
those substantive rights which are grounded in the Bill of Rights and
applied to the states because of their incorporation into the fourteenth
amendment ...
The voters in this case, by contrast, do not base their § 1983 claim
upon any inadequacy in Georgia's judicial remedies. Their due process claim is not procedural, but substantive. . . . Parrattprovides
no support to the Georgia officials, however, because this case turns
on the substantive guarantees of the due process clause.'
2. Implication of the Ingraham-ParrattPrinciple
Although the ultimate contours of the formulations demanded and suggested by Ingraham and Parrattare uncertain, it is possible to draw from
them at least some tentative conclusions about the relationship between
constitutional claims pursuant to section 1983 and available state tort
remedies. First, the Court recognized that the procedural claims and the
incorporated and substantive rights claims are distinct section 1983 constitutional claims even though they are all based on the due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment. Second, it is common that conduct which
gives rise to one or several of these kinds of constitutional claims is also
a tort under state law. Parrattcounsels that if the conduct under scrutiny
is negligence (and therefore actionable under state law), and results in a
loss of or deprivation of property, there is no constitutional claim. Neither
Parrattnor Ingraham suggest that conduct amounting to a denial of an
incorporated right fails to state a claim under section 1983, even though
state tort law is available to grant relief for the conduct. For example,
searches and seizures held to be unreasonable under the fourth and fourteenth amendments frequently consist of conduct amounting to trespass,
assault, and occasionally battery.97 There is nothing in Parrattto suggest
that this kind of conduct ceases to be a constitutional violation merely
because it is also a tort and therefore actionable under state law. Indeed,
Justice Rehnquist, writing for the Court in Parratt,distinguished the claim
96. 657 F.2d at 704.
97. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961).

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 13

in Parrattfrom such an incorporated rights claim. 98 Nor is there anything
in Parrattwhich requires dismissal of a section 1983 action based on
arbitrary, shocking governmental abuses or intrusions into protected spheres
of privacy-a substantive due process claim- even though state tort law
might provide remedies based on the same conduct. But Justice Rehnquist's failure expressly to recognize the possibility of the coexistence of
substantive and procedural due process claims in the Parrattopinion99 is
troublesome. Because the opinion does not give guidance in distinguishing
procedural claims from substantive claims, and mentions only the differentiation between incorporated and procedural claims, a court might
conclude that if a section 1983 complaint does not state an incorporated
rights claim, it is necessarily a procedural due process claim. The court
might then erroneously grant a motion to dismiss if there were available
state tort remedies, without grappling with the difficult question of whether
the complaint states a substantive due process claim. °
3. An Alternative to the Parratt-IngrahamApproach
There is an even more important failure in both Ingraham and Parratt.
If lower courts rely on the availability of state remedies to decide whether
a constitutional claim exists, there is a risk of establishing a merely
mechanical test to determine the shape of a claim rather than attempting
to define constitutionally objectionable government behavior. This is particularly dangerous if lower courts fail to make the distinction between
claims based on denial of procedural, substantive and incorporated rights
and instead consider the availability of state tort remedies relevant to the
existence of a section 1983 claim, irrespective of the nature of the claim.
98. If Parrattwere read to mean that a claim could not rise to the level of a constitutional claim
any time state law was available to redress the conduct, Parrattwould have substantially overruled
Monroe v. Pape.
99. In Mills v. Rogers, 50 U.S.L.W. 4676 (U.S. June 18, 1982), Justice Powell did recognize
that a mixed question of procedure and substance exists in a case where the issue is whether an
involuntarily confined patient can be forced to take anti-psychotic drugs. In that case, the Court
reached neither question because of uncertainty about state law.
100. Unprovoked attacks by police officials or guards on pretrial detainees may present the clearest
example of this problem. Because the eighth amendment protections against cruel and unusual
punishment generally come into play only after conviction for a crime, a complaint alleging this
kind of conduct does not present an eighth amendment incorporation-type § 1983 claim. To conclude
that the availability of post-deprivation state tort remedies prevents such attacks from giving rise to
constitutional claims at all would, however, surely be wrong. Such conduct is not merely a matter
of denial of procedural due process. It is a governmental abuse which is not corrected by the provision
of procedural safeguards. See Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. at 553 (Powell, J., concurring). See also
Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979), in which the Supreme Court recognized that "under the Due
Process Clause, a detainee may not be punished prior to an adjudication of guilt in accordance with
due process of law." Id. at 535.
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Without examining the grievousness of the constitutional harm, or even
the adequacy of the state remedy, courts might routinely dismiss section
1983 actions merely because some state remedy exists. This may undermine the courts' ability to guarantee constitutional rights. Attention to the
task of describing constitutionally invalid conduct serves the desirable
objective of educating public officials on the kind of conduct the Constitution forbids. The United States Supreme Court has not exercised
leadership in accepting the invitation presented in cases starting with
Monroe v. Pape, which encouraged courts to delimit and define the conduct which gives rise to the supplemental relief allowed by 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983. Instead, in Parrattand Ingraham, the Court seems to have focused
on the wrong question-the question of whether state remedies are available to redress the wrong. In deciding whether an action exists under
section 1983, courts must initially consider whether an abuse of governmental power has taken place rather than considering the question of the
presence of state law. It is the abuse of governmental power that the
fourteenth amendment forbids. The availability of state tort remedies is
at best only tangentially germane to the issue of abusiveness. Furthermore,
if the governmental conduct is not abusive, but merely random, careless,
and unauthorized, a constitutional claim ought not to exist, even when
the immunity law of a state forbids a tort remedy.
It is, admittedly, exceedingly difficult to determine the sorts of governmental behavior which amount to abuse and therefore constitute constitutional claims, whether or not those abuses are also torts. The use of
some mechanical formula to sort out state law cases from constitutional
cases is appealing for that reason. Focusing on availability of state remedies rather than on the nature of the conduct, however, will not only
fail to guide public officials in their conduct, but will present more state
law questions to federal courts than would otherwise be presented. Issues
involving interpretation of often obscure state immunity laws, such as
the New Mexico Tort Claims Act, will be present in any case where
availability of state law is in question.
There is an alternative to the mechanical applications of the "availability of state law" approach. If the conduct can be characterized as
governmental abuse of an individual (or group) rather than the random,
accidental conduct of a state employee or official, then it is a deprivation
of a constitutional right. Some factors which the courts might consider
are: (1) the likelihood that the conduct will cause unjustified intrusion
into an individual's personal or physical integrity or property rights; (2)
the degree to which the defendant's conduct is a misuse of power which
he possesses solely by virtue of his official or public position; and (3)
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whether the conduct is highly arbitrary, discriminatory or "shocking to
the conscience. 101
For example, a guard who uses excessive force in dealing with a
prisoner is abusing the power which he has by virtue of his position, and
that should be sufficient for a showing of governmental abuse. Similarly,
a supervisor abuses his power when he fails to discipline guards whom
he knows or has reason to know are using excessive force; his failure to
discipline increases the risk of unjustified intrusion into the physical
integrity of inmates.' 2 If, on an application of such factors, the court can
conclude that governmental abuse exists, then it is appropriate to go on
to the question of whether the abuse can be cured by compensation
available under remedial provisions other than a section 1983 damages
action. Presumably, conduct which would "shock the conscience," is
highly arbitrary, or is discriminatory, cannot be made right even if there
is a flawless procedure preceding the conduct. Occasionally, the objectionable governmental conduct is a denial of a hearing. The denial is
objectionable precisely because provision of the hearing itself would
reduce the risk of unjustified physical, personal or property invasion. '°3
The sort of government abuse which denies a hearing presents a procedural
due process claim."° It is only this kind of section 1983 claim which
should be affected when state tort remedies are available to supply adequate process. Even this kind of constitutional claim ought to survive as
an independent section 1983 claim when a pre-deprivation hearing is
necessary to satisfy procedural due process.
III. SECTION 1983 AND THE NEW MEXICO TORT CLAIMS
ACT
The preceding exegesis considers when the existence of a state tort
remedy will, and also when it should, prevent the existence of a claim
pursuant to section 1983. It should be clear that in a large number of
101. This analysis suggests a slightly different basis for the Parratidecision. Under this approach,
it ought to be clear that the random, unauthorized, carelessness of a state employee which results
in a property loss or bodily injury does not amount to a constitutional claim. This is not the sort of
governmental abuse that the fourteenth amendment was designed to correct or prevent. Often state
law is available to remedy these kinds of losses; even if it is not, the conduct simply does not violate
the Constitution.
102. See McClelland v. Facteau, 610 F.2d 693 (10th Cir. 1979).
103. The kinds of cases that come to mind in this category are those involving discharge of public
employees who had some expectancy (created by state law) of retention. Certainly some cases that
are on the edge of arbitrariness, such as subjecting mentally retarded individuals in a state institution
to electric shock can be saved from arbitrariness by requiring a hearing, and therefore, are properly
analyzed as either denials of substantive or procedural due process. See, e.g., Rennie v. Klein, 653
F.2d 836 (3d Cir. 1981).
104. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
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cases, the section 1983 claim and the state tort claim may coexist, at
least so long as The Tort Claims Act waives immunity for the tort action.
This article now turns to an examination of the points of intersection
between section 1983 claims and state tort claims available pursuant to
the New Mexico Tort Claims Act.
In 1975, the New Mexico Supreme Court abolished sovereign immunity
as a defense in tort actions.° 5 During the next legislative session in 1976,
the legislature enacted the Tort Claims Act 10 6 to re-establish the defense.
10 7
Initial confusion about the legislative goals, amendments to the Act,
and judicial construction of the Act have combined to make the content
and the limits of the doctrine of sovereign immunity in New Mexico
uncertain. Some things, however, are clear.
The basic structure of the Act has been set forth elsewhere. 108 The
legislature has altered the Act only slightly by amendment. The Act
immunizes from liability both the governmental entity and any public
employee acting within the scope of his duty,'" except as waived by
express provisions of the Act. "0 The governmental entity must defend
and pay a settlement or judgment for any public employee who commits
a tort while acting within the scope of his duty unless an insurance carrier
provides a defense."'
A governmental entity and its public employees may assert any defense
available under state law. "2 The statute of limitations is two years after
the date of the occurrence causing injury,"' and a plaintiff must present
a notice of claim to a specified official within ninety days after the occurrence to establish jurisdiction. "' The Tort Claims Act is the exclusive
105. Hicks v. New Mexico, 88 N.M. 588, 544 P.2d 1153 (1975).
106. N.M. Stat. Ann. §§41-4-1 to -29 (Repl. Pamp. 1982).
107. 1977 N.M. Laws ch. 386; 1978 N.M. Laws ch. 166.
108. Kovnat, Torts: Sovereign and Governmental Immunity in New Mexico, 6 N.M.L. Rev. 249
(1976); Note, Torts-Government Immunity Under the New Mexico Tort Claims Act. II N.M.L.
Rev. 475 (1981).
109. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 41-4-4(A) (Repl. Pamp. 1982).
110. Waivers of immunity are set out in N.M. Stat. Ann. §§41-4-5 to -12 (Repl. Pamp. 1982).
Waiver is limited to and governed by N.M. Stat. Ann. §§44-4-13 to -25 (1978 & Cum. Supp.
1982).
111. N.M. Stat. Ann. §§41-4-4(B), (D) (Repl. Pamp. 1982).
112. The New Mexico Supreme Court abolished contributory negligence as a complete defense
in New Mexico and accepted comparative negligence as a matter of common law. Scott v. Rizzo,
96 N.M. 682, 634 P.2d 1234 (1981).
113. N.M. Stat. Ann. §41-4-15 (Repl. Pamp. 1982).
114. N.M. Stat. Ann. §41-4-16 (Repl. Pamp. 1982). See Martinez v. City of Clovis, 95 N.M.
654, 625 P.2d 583 (1980), which holds that § 41-4-16 does not impose obligation of notice of claim
on persons seeking to impose liability on a public employee as distinguished from the governmental
entity. As for the statutory requirement that a mayor of a municipality be presented with notice of
the claim, notice to the municipality's insurer satisfied the statute in Martinez, at least where there
was evidence that the insurer, not the mayor, investigated the accident claim. Id. at 656-57, 625
P.2d at 585-86.
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state remedy against a governmental entity or public employee," 5 with
exclusive jurisdiction in the state district courts."I6 There is no waiver of
the state's immunity from suit in federal court under the eleventh amendment to the United States Constitution." 7 Liability of governmental entities or public employees is limited under the Act," 8 and punitive damages
are prohibited. 9
The New Mexico Supreme Court has made no secret of the rule of
construction which is applicable to the Tort Claims Act. After Hicks v.
New Mexico, 21 0 sovereign immunity is not available as a common law
defense to a tort claim in New Mexico. Because the Tort Claims Act is
in derogation of the common law, the Act must be strictly construed.' 2
In a case involving a close question of statutory construction, the courts
will decide against immunity.' 22
A. Overlap Between the Act and Section 1982
The majority of waivers of immunity in the Tort Claims Act address
situations that are unlikely to present constitutional claims.' 23 The law
115. N.M. Stat. Ann. §41-4-17(A) (Repl. Pamp. 1982). In cases where § 1983 claims were
joined with state tort claims, defendants have urged a construction of this provision which would
prohibit a plaintiff from bringing an action under the Act when he also pursues an action pursuant
to § 1983. The supreme court rejected this construction in Wells v. County of Valencia, N.M.
-,
644 P.2d 517 (1982). See supra text accompanying notes 136-140.
116. N.M. Stat. Ann. §41-4-18 (Repl. Pamp. 1982).
117. N.M. Stat. Ann. §41-4-4(F) (Repl. Pamp. 1982). See Korgich v. Regents, 582 F.2d 549
(10th Cir. 1978).
118. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 41-4-19(A) (Repl. Pamp. 1982) provides: (1) $100,000, property damage
to any person arising out of a single occurrence. (2) $300,000 damages to any person for damage
for other than property damage arising out of a single occurrence. (3) $500,000 for all claims arising
out of a single occurrence.
119. N.M. Stat. Ann. §41-4-19 (Repl. Pamp. 1982). In 1982, the Act was amended to permit payment of punitive damages by a governmental entity if they are awarded under the substantive law of a jurisdiction other than New Mexico. N.M. Stat. Ann. 41-4-4(C) (Repl. Pamp.
1982).
120. 88 N.M. 588, 544 P.2d 1153 (1975).
121. Id.
122. See Methola v. County of Eddy, 95 N.M. 329, 622 P.2d 234 (1980); Holiday Management
Co. v. City of Santa Fe, 94 N.M. 368, 610 P.2d 1197 (1980).
123. N.M. Stat. Ann. §§41-4-5 through -12 (Repl. Pamp. 1982) state:
41-4-5. Liability; operation or maintenance of motor vehicles, aircraft and
watercraft.
The immunity granted pursuant to Subsection A of Section 41-4-4 NMSA
1978 does not apply to liability for damages resulting from bodily injury,
wrongful death or property damage caused by the negligence of public employees while acting within the scope of their duties in the operation or maintenance of any motor vehicle, aircraft or watercraft.
41-4-6. Liability; buildings, public parks, machinery, equipment and furnishings.
The immunity granted pursuant to Subsection A of Section 41-4-4 NMSA
1978 does not apply to liability for damages resulting from bodily injury,
wrongful death or property damage caused by the negligence of public em-
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ployees while acting within the scope of their duties in the operation or maintenance of any building, public park, machinery, equipment or furnishings.
Nothing in this section shall be construed as granting waiver of immunity for
any damages arising out of the operation or maintenance of works used for
diversion or storage of water.
41-4-7. Liability; airports.
A. The immunity granted pursuant to Subsection A of Section 4[41-4-4
NMSA 19781 of the Tort Claims Act does not apply to liability for damages
resulting from bodily injury, wrongful death or property damage caused by the
negligence of public employees while acting within the scope of their duties
in the operation of airports.
B. The liability imposed pursuant to Subsection A of this section shall not
include liability for damages due to the existence of any condition arising out
of compliance with any federal or state law or regulation governing the use
and operation of airports.
41-4-8. Liability; public utilities.
A. The immunity granted pursuant to Subsection A of Section 4[41-4-4
NMSA 19781 of the Tort Claims Act does not apply to liability for damages
resulting from bodily injury, wrongful death or property damage caused by the
negligence of public employees while acting within the scope of their duties
in the operation of the following public utilities and services: gas; electricity;
water; solid or liquid waste collection or disposal; heating; and ground transportation.
B. The liability imposed pursuant to Subsection A of this section shall not
include liability for damages resulting from bodily injury, wrongful death or
property damage:
(1) caused by a failure to provide an adequate supply of gas, water,
electricity or services as described in Subsection A of this section; or
(2) arising out of the discharge, dispersal, release or escape of smoke,
vapors, soot, fumes, acids, alkalis, toxic chemicals, liquids or gases, waste
materials or other irritants, contaminants or pollutants into or upon land, the
atmosphere or any watercourse or body of water.
44-4-9. Liability; medical facilities.
The immunity granted pursuant to Subsection A of Section 41-4-4 NMSA
1978 does not apply to liability for damages resulting from bodily injury,
wrongful death or property damage caused by the negligence of public employees while acting within the scope of their duties in the operation of any
hospital, infirmary, mental institution, clinic, dispensary, medical care home
or like facilities.
44-4-10. Liability; health care providers.
The immunity granted pursuant to Subsection A of Section 41-4-4 NMSA
1978 does not apply to liability for damages resulting from bodily injury,
wrongful death or property damage caused by the negligence of public employees licensed by the state or permitted by law to provide health care services
while acting within the scope of their duties of providing health care services.
44-4-11. Liability; highways and streets.
A. The immunity granted pursuant to Subsection A of Section 41-4-4 NMSA
1978 does not apply to liability for damages resulting from bodily injury,
wrongful death or property damage caused by the negligence of public employees while acting within the scope of their duties in the maintenance of or
for the existence of any bridge, culvert, highway, roadway, street, alley, sidewalk or parking area.
B. The liability for which immunity has been waived pursuant to Subsection
A of this section shall not include liability for damages caused by:
(1) a defect in plan or design of any bridge, culvert, highway, roadway,
street, alley, sidewalk or parking area; or
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enforcement officers' waiver of immunity,'24 however, presents the occasion for overlap between section 1983 and state tort claims. 125 For
example, a complaint alleging that a police officer shot an unarmed suspect
without any reason to believe that the suspect endangered the police officer
almost certainly states a section 1983 claim. 26 It also may state a claim
against the police officer and the governmental entity which employs
him 27 on a battery theory. Section 12 of the Tort Claims Act provides
that the general immunity granted by the Act does not apply to liability
for, among other things, bodily injury resulting from battery which was
caused by a law enforcement officer while acting within the scope of his
duties. Accordingly, both federal and state remedies are available.' 28
An Indiana case, Roberts v. Indiana, 29 exemplifies another fact pattern
which presents coexisting state and federal claims. The plaintiff, a prison
inmate, was walking in the exercise yard when 200 inmates gathered to
(2) the failure to construct or reconstruct any bridge, culvert, highway,
roadway, street, alley, sidewalk or parking area.
44-4-12. Liability; law enforcement officers.
The immunity granted pursuant to Subsection A of Section 41-4-4 NMSA
1978 does not apply to liability for personal injury, bodily injuri, wrongful
death or property damage resulting from assault, battery, false imprisonment,
false arrest, malicious prosecution, abuse of process, libel, slander, defamation
of character, violation of property rights or deprivation of any rights, privileges
or immunities secured by the constitution and laws of the United States or New
Mexico when caused by law enforcement officers while acting within the scope
of their duties.
124. N.M. Stat. Ann. §41-4-12 (Repl. Pamp. .1982) states:
Liability; law enforcement officers.
The immunity granted pursuant to Subsection A of Section 41-4-4 NMSA
1978 does not apply to liability for personal injury, bodily injury, wrongful
death or property damage resulting from assault, battery, false imprisonment,
false arrest, malicious prosecution, abuse of process, libel, slander, defamation
of character, violation of property rights or deprivation of any rights, privileges
or immunities secured by the constitution and laws of the United States or New
Mexico when caused by law enforcement officers while acting within the scope
of their duties.
125. Although it is obvious that the waiver of liability most frequently involved in cases which
present possible § 1983 claims is the law enforcement officers' waiver of immunity, others may come
into play. For example, in a number of actions arising out of the New Mexico Penitentiary riot of
February, 1980, the waiver of immunity contained in N.M. Stat. Ann. § 41-4-6 (Repl. Pamp. 1982),
relating to negligent maintenance and operation of any building, is prominent in the litigation. A
variety of civil rights claims also arose from the riot.
126. Violation of the fourth and fourteenth amendment prohibitions against unreasonable searches
and seizures gives rise to an incorporated due process claim, and an arbitrary violation of personal
integrity presents a substantive due process claim. See, e.g., Jenkins v. Averette, 424 F.2d 1228
(4th Cir. 1970).
127. Issues of respondeat superior and supervisory liability are addressed infra at text accompanying notes 154-177.
128. If both claims coexist, they presumably may be litigated together either in state or federal
court.
129. 307 N.E.2d 501 (Ind. Ct. App. 1974).
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protest an administrative action of the prison officials. The plaintiff was
not part of the demonstration, but was ordered by the armed guards to
sit near the protestors. The guards fired into the crowd, severely injuring
the plaintiff. The guards were allegedly negligent in shooting into the
crowd and their captain, who had given the order, allegedly breached his
duty to the plaintiff to take reasonable precautions to preserve the health,
life, and safety of a person in custody. 130 In the Roberts fact pattern, the
availability of both the section 1983 claim and the state tort claim would
be somewhat more complicated than in the case where the defendant's
intentional conduct directly causes the plaintiff injury. If the conduct of
the guards and their captain were simply negligent, some courts would
conclude that no claim is stated under section 1983.131 There is, however,
strong countervailing authority132 and even where negligence has been
held insufficient to state a section 1983 claim, gross negligence or recklessness may be adequate. 13 3 The question of whether immunity is waived
by the Tort Claims Act turns on the construction of "law enforcement
officer" in section 41-4-12 and a determination of whether negligence
causing bodily injury fits within the waiver. 134 It is likely, however, that
both claims are potentially available in such a case.
B. Exclusiveness of Remedy Provision-theNew Mexico State Law
Does Not Exclude Section 1983
Of course, some cases present only section 1983 claims, and not state
tort claims. The absence of an appropriate waiver of immunity in the
Tort Claims Act would foreclose a state claim. 35 State claims might also
have been foreclosed by virtue of construction of the exclusive remedy
provision in the Tort Claims Act. 136 State tort-claim defendants had con130. See City of Belen v. Harrell, 93 N.M. 601, 603 P.2d 711 (1979), for the proposition that
such a duty exists in New Mexico.
131. See, e.g., Mills v. Smith, 656 F.2d 337 (8th Cir. 1981).
132. See, e.g., Withers v. Levine, 615 F.2d 158 (4th Cir. 1980); Watson v. McGee, 50 U.S.L.W.
2373 (S.D. Ohio Dec. 1, 1981).
133. See, e.g., Smith v. Hill, 510 F. Supp 767 (D.Utah 1981).
134. In Methola v. County of Eddy, 95 N.M. 329, 622 P.2d 234 (1980), the supreme court
addressed these sorts of questions. The court held that a jail guard fit within the definition of "law
enforcement officer" in N.M. Stat. Ann. § 41-4-3(D) (Repl. Pamp. 1982). Presumably, a captain of
the guard on the scene would be treated similarly. It is not clear, however, whether a prison warden
or the Director of the Department of Corrections is a "law enforcement officer" within the meaning
of the Act. The court also held that negligence of a law enforcement officer fits within the waiver.
135. An example of this is found in Garcia v. Bd. of Educ., 95 N.M. 391, 622 P.2d 699 (Ct.
App. 1980).
136. N.M. Stat. Ann. §41-4-17(A) (Repl. Pamp. 1982). The Act also contains an exclusive
jurisdiction provision. See N.M. Stat. Ann. §41-4-18(A) (Repl. Pamp. 1982). In Nevada v. Hall,
440 U.S. 410 (1979), the Supreme Court diminished the vitality of an exclusive jurisdiction provision
similar to New Mexico's. In Nevada, the Supreme Court held that Nevada was not immune from
suit and judgment in the courts of California despite this exclusive jurisdiction provision.
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sistently argued that if a plaintiff decides to pursue a section 1983 claim,
the waiver of immunity that might otherwise be applicable is unavailable
because of the exclusiveness of remedy provision. Thus, even though the
conduct is tortious under state law, sovereign immunity will bar recovery,
and only the federal claim remains. The practical impact of this interpretation of section 41-4-17(A) is to prevent the plaintiff who files a
section 1983 claim from joining state claims. He must make this decision
very early, at a stage when it may be too early to predict the likelihood
of success on the constitutional theories. Thus, plaintiff may lose his
recovery entirely if his section 1983 action fails.
The question of the meaning of section 41-4-17(A) was certifiedt37 to
the New Mexico Supreme Court in the case of Wells v. County of Valencia. 3' In Wells, the plaintiff was detained in the Valencia County jail.
While awaiting trial, officials separated plaintiff from the prison population for reasons which were in dispute. There was no light in plaintiff's
cell. He stepped into an uncovered hole in the floor of the cell, fell, and
suffered a head injury. Plaintiff sought redress under both 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 and the New Mexico Tort Claims Act. The defendants contended
that the filing of a section 1983 claim ought to result in the interposition
of a sovereign immunity defense to the joined state tort claim. "'
In Wells, the New Mexico Supreme Court rejected the defendants'
proposed construction of the exclusiveness of remedy provision. It held
that the legislature did not intend to condition its waiver of sovereign
immunity for certain torts by prohibiting a plaintiff from exercising federal
rights. The court noted that section 41-4-17(A) does not, by its terms,
prohibit the bringing of a federal action. The court concluded that the
literal reading urged by defendants would force an abandonment of the
federal claim in cases like Wells, where the facts alleged would clearly
support a finding of negligence under state law, but where ultimate success
on a section 1983 claim is not so certain. The court was unwilling to
force plaintiff to risk losing his recovery under state law. At the same
time, the court felt that it was unfair to force plaintiff to abandon his
federal claim. The court recognized that the section 1983 action has at
least one practical advantage for plaintiff as compared to the state tort
137. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 34-2-8 (1978) authorizes answer of questions certified to the New Mexico
Supreme Court from the federal courts.
N.M. -. , 644 P.2d 517 (1982).
138. 139. This is the logical outcome of this construction of N.M. Stat. Ann. §41-4-17(A) (Repl.
Pamp. 1982), whether plaintiff attempts to join claims in either federal or state court. Note that
defendants did not argue that §41-4-17(A) prevents plaintiff from pursuing his § 1983 claim, an
argument with serious constitutional problems. See Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277 (1980).
They instead argued that the legislature has power to grant full immunity. It therefore has the lesser
power to condition the waiver of immunity on following a particular procedure contained in the Act.
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claim-unlimited liability. The court did not mention the other advantages
of the section 1983 action from the plaintiff's view, but those advantages
also may have influenced the court. A section 1983 action includes the
possibility of punitive damages, attorneys fees, and an arguably longer
statute of limitation. " If plaintiff were required to elect between the
section 1983 claim and tort claims, he would have to choose the tort
claim if the likelihood of success on that claim seemed greater than the
likelihood of success on the section 1983 claim. He would have to give
up the advantages of the section 1983 claim, even though it is possible
that he might ultimately have prevailed on the section 1983 claim, if he
had been permitted to pursue it. The court stated that a chilling effect on
the exercise of federal rights is tantamount to a denial of federal rights
and that would violate the supremacy clause of the United States Constitution. The court therefore construed the statute to avoid the question
of its unconstitutionality. The court recognized that a risk of double
recovery exists, if the same conduct is found to be both a tort for which
liability has been waived, and a constitutional violation. Nevertheless,
the Wells court seemed to believe that the general principles militating
against double recovery are adequate to avoid the problem.
C. Comparison of Claims Under Section 1983 Claims and Claims
Under The New Mexico Tort Claims Act
Although Wells concentrated on the advantages of a section 1983 claim
to the plaintiff, it is clear that there are cases in which the plaintiff would
have a better chance of recovering under a state tort claim. For example,
a negligence claim can be made more easily under the Tort Claims Act. 4
Actions against the state, its agencies, and local governmental bodies are
expressly within the waivers of immunity in the Tort Claims Act. A city
and other like governmental entities are proper defendants under section
1983 only if there is proof of a "policy or custom," which deprives the
plaintiff of constitutional rights.' 42 The state is a problematic defendant
in a section 1983 action, either because it is immune from suit in federal
court by virtue of the eleventh amendment'4 3 or because as a matter of
statutory construction, it is not "a person" within the meaning of section
1983.1" It is useful to compare section 1983 and the Tort Claims Act in
more detail from the perspective of these differences.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.

Gunther v. Miller, 498 F. Supp. 882 (D.N.M. 1980).
See Methola v. County of Eddy, 95 N.M. 329, 622 P.2d 234 (1980).
Monell v. Dep't of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332 (1979).
See infra text accompanying notes 192-201.
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1. Negligence and Supervisory Liability
a. Tort Claims Act
When the facts of a case support findings of negligent, but not intentional, conduct on the part of the potential defendant, tort claims are a
more certain source of compensation to an injured party than a section
1983 claim. This is not self-evident from the language of either section
1983 or the Tort Claims Act. In Methola v. County of Eddy,'45 the court
was presented with an argument that the statutory waiver existed only
when the conduct of the defendant officer is intentional. In the face of
this contention, the court interpreted the statutory waiver of liability
contained in section 41-4-12 to apply to injuries caused by the negligence
of a sheriff, his deputies, and city jailers. Methola held that there is a
waiver of immunity for the negligent conduct of law enforcement officers.
Methola did not involve the issue of supervisory liability, but the construction of the statutory waiver of liability addressed in Methola also
can arise when the defendant's conduct in a supervisory capacity is the
indirect cause of an injury. For example, the waiver should apply when
a prison warden fails adequately to train guards, and the failure results
in the guards' use of excessive force on an inmate. The plaintiff would
have to establish a negligence cause of action by alleging and showing
that the prison warden's failure increased the risk of the guards' use of
force. 46 Once the plaintiff has established the negligence, the only question under state law would be whether the defendant-supervisor is a law
enforcement officer under the Act. The statutory definition 47 of law
enforcement officer is not limited to persons who are in direct contact
with persons in custody, nor is it limited to persons who make arrests.
The definition includes public employees whose principal duties are to
maintain public order. The core responsibility of police chiefs, prison
wardens, directors of departments of corrections, and perhaps other correctional officials in a supervisory capacity, is maintenance of public order.
Accordingly, the waiver of immunity for misconduct of law enforcement
officers, whether negligent or intentional, ought to be applicable to supervisory level law enforcement officers 48as well as to law enforcement
officers lower in the chain of command.
145. 95 N.M. 329, 622 P.2d 234 (1980).
146. Id. at 332-33, 622 P.2d at 237-38.
147. Under N.M. Stat. Ann. §41-4-3(D) (Repl. Pamp. 1982):
'law enforcement officer' means any full-time salaried public employee of a
governmental entity whose principal duties under law are to hold in custody
any person accused of a criminal offense, to maintain public order or to make
arrests for crimes, or members of the national guard when called to active duty
by the governor.
148. It is not likely tht issues of supervisory liability will be the subject of litigation under the
Tort Claims Act. A plaintiff seeks compensation in a tort action against a government employee and
the governmental entity which employs him. It is not necessary to join everyone in the chain of
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b. Section 1983
The issue of whether negligent conduct can be the basis of a section
1983 action normally arises in the context of supervisory liability, but it
obviously can be a question even when the alleged negligence is that of
the person whose conduct directly causes the injury. For example, in
Mills v. Smith, 49 the defendant police officer's gun discharged while the
police officer was attempting to handcuff the plaintiff. Plaintiff was wounded
in the back and sued for damages under section 1983. The federal district
court had found that defendant's conduct was at most negligent and
therefore was not a basis of recovery under section 1983. The circuit
court affirmed. Although the court recognized that under Parrattv. Taylor,
negligence may be the basis of a section 1983 claim for deprivation of
property, the Mills court found that the lower court had not erred in
concluding that the conduct in this case did not amount to a constitutional
1
deprivation. 50
command. So long as any employee has caused injury within the scope of his employment, the
governmental entity is liable through ordinary principles of vicarious liability, provided that the
employee's conduct falls within one of the eight waivers of immunity. Indeed, the statute provides
that the governmental entity has the duty to defend and pay judgments or settlements against its
employees arising out of tortious conduct that occurs within the scope of employment. See N.M.
Stat. Ann. § 41-4-4 (Repl. Pamp. 1982). The statute also imposes the latter requirement on governmental entities when the plaintiff's constitutional rights have been violated.
149. 656 F.2d 337 (8th Cir. 1981).
150. The doctrine of the good faith defense to a § 1983 claim has sometimes motivated courts to
conclude that negligent conduct cannot be the basis of a § 1983 claim. They have reasoned that
plaintiff's § 1983 claim must be based on conduct more serious than negligence because a defendant
is entitled to immunity for acts done in good faith within the scope of his official duties, even though
that good faith conduct results in a constitutional deprivation. In McClelland v. Facteau, 610 F.2d
693 (10th Cir. 1979), the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals said, for example, that "[a]rguably the
good faith immunity ... is recognition that something more than ordinary negligence is required
of supervisory personnel." Id. at 696.
The good faith defense to § 1983 claims is akin to the common law immunity afforded to governmental officials. Courts have described the defense as a qualified immunity available in varying
degree to officials of the executive branch of government. The variation is dependent upon the scope
of discretion and responsibility of the official and upon all of the circumstances as they reasonably
appeared at the time of the alleged misconduct. The existence of reasonable grounds for the belief,
formed at the time and in light of all the circumstances, coupled with a good faith belief, affords a
basis for qualified immunity of executive officers. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 247-48 (1974).
See also Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555 (1978), in which the Supreme Court discussed the
good faith defense. The Court held that the defense is unavailable when, at the time of the conduct,
there is a clearly recognized constitutional right, the defendant knew or should have known of the
existence of the right, and the defendant knew or should have know that his conduct violated the
clearly established constitutional fight.
In Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635 (1980), the Court held that in a § 1983 action, a plaintiff is
not required to allege that the official acted in bad faith in order to state a claim for relief. The
burden is on the public official to plead qualified immunity as a defense. It should follow that the
burden of persuasion as to the immunity is on the defendant as well. Justice Rehnquist, however,
in a concurring opinion, noted that the question of burden of persuasion, as distinguished from the
burden of pleading immunity, remained open.
It is the author's view that the mere existence of a good faith defense ought not defeat the
possibility of a § 1983 claim based on negligent conduct. In a negligence claim, the plaintiff seeks
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To understand whether a section 1983 claim can be based on negligence,
the ubiquitous case of Parrattv. Taylor must once again be examined.
In Parratt, Justice Rehnquist was willing to assume that deprivation of
property, even if caused by merely negligent behavior of governmental
officials, could constitute a constitutional deprivation if accomplished
without procedural due process. This aspect of Parratthas also influenced
lower courts.
In Watson v. McGee,' individuals confined as pretrial detainees at a
city jail suffered smoke inhalation, lung damage, and other physical
injuries from a fire at the jail. The detainees brought a section 1983 claim
against defendants whose negligence had allegedly caused them to be
exposed to the fire hazard. The detainees based the action on the theory
that they had been deprived of life and liberty in violation of the fourteenth
amendment due process clause. The defendants sought dismissal because
the complaint was based solely on the negligent conduct of the defendants.
The court refused to dismiss the complaint, concluding that Parrattrecognizes that negligence is cognizable under section 1983. The court said
[A]lthough there may not have been an express intent on the part of
the City of Dayton, or its officials, to punish the Plaintiffs, there
nevertheless appears to have been scant justification or purpose for
the existence of conditions which endangered the lives of persons
who are powerless either to alter those conditions, or to escape their
effects. 52
In Major v. Benton,' 3 a pre-Parrattcase, the Tenth Circuit reached a
different conclusion. Plaintiff's decedent was killed by a cave-in of a
sewer ditch in which he had been working while serving time as an
Oklahoma state prisoner. Several serious cave-ins had occurred. The
plaintiff alleged that defendants' failure to implement safer conditions for
digging resulted in deprivation of decedent's life without due process of
law. The court concluded that specific constitutional guarantees must be
implicated to give rise to due process claims. Death resulting from the
to establish that the defendant acted unreasonably; this is a question for the trier of fact. If the trier
of fact finds that the defendant acted unreasonably, two conclusions of law might follow. First, that
the plaintiff proved his claim of constitutional deprivation even though the defendant's conduct was
merely negligent. Second, that the defendant was not entitled to immunity based on good faith. On
the other hand, if the trier of fact finds defendant's conduct to be reasonable, the good faith immunity
does apply. In the latter situation, plaintiff does not lose because § 1983 claims can never be based
on negligence, but either because reasonable conduct can never constitute aconstitutional deprivation,
or because reasonable conduct is a defense to a claim of constitutional deprivation. That a good
faith defense is available should not be used to prevent plaintiffs from having the opportunity to
show that a defendant's unreasonable conduct caused them a constitutional deprivation under § 1983.
151. 527 F. Supp. 234 (S.D. Ohio 1981).
152. Id. at 241.
153. 647 F.2d 110 (10th Cir. 1981). See also Bonner v. Coughlin, 545 F.2d 565 (7th Cir. 1976)
(en banc).
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negligent action of a state official does not become a violation of the
fourteenth amendment merely because the defendant is a state official.
Unlike the court in Watson, the Benton court paid no attention to the
powerlessness of the decedent to protect himself from the unsafe conditions created by the negligence of the defendants and affirmed a summary judgment ruling that defendants were free of section 1983 liability.
The full impact of Parratton this issue remains to be seen. It is worth
noticing that Parrattappears to have two competing impulses. To the
extent that it stands for the proposition that available state tort remedies
preclude a section 1983 claim for deprivation of procedural due process,
it reduces the number of possible section 1983 claims. To the extent it
may recognize negligence as a basis for the section 1983 action, it expands
the number of potential section 1983 claims. These counter-directions
permit federal judges who believe that section 1983 claims should be
broadly available to deter unconstitutional conduct to expand the application of section 1983 in reliance on Parratt. Judges who believe that
section 1983 is a plaintiff's device to convert state tort actions into federal
constitutional actions can restrict section 1983 actions, also in reliance
on Parratt. It would have been preferable if the ParrattCourt had announced a definition of governmental abuse which could have been applied uniformly by lower federal courts.
In the particular context of law enforcement, the question of negligence
as a basis for a section 1983 action becomes still more complicated when
the defendant is a supervisor.' 54 The holding in Rizzo v. Goode'55 is the
major impediment to liability of supervisory officials on simple negligence. Rizzo was a section 1983 class action seeking equitable relief, not
damages. Its reasoning has, however, influenced lower courts when they
are presented with section 1983 damages actions against supervisory law
enforcement officers. The plaintiffs in Rizzo claimed that there was a
pervasive pattern of police mistreatment of minority citizens, in particular,
as well as of all city residents. After extensive hearings during which
evidence was presented with respect to forty incidents, the district court
found that the evidence showed an unacceptably high number of cases
of police abuse. The individual officers who were directly involved in
the incidents were not named defendants. Rather, the plaintiffs sought to
hold the police commissioner, city manager, and mayor responsible for
the misconduct. Despite the absence of the individual officers, the district
154. The author has said that supervisory liability is not likely to be a hotly contested issue in
litigation under the Tort Claims Act because if any employee acts negligently the governmental
entity which employs him is also liable. See supra note 148. The principle that the governmental
entity is automatically liable does not apply to § 1983 claims. There are problems with entity liability
under § 1983. See supra text accompanying notes 178-201. It is therefore in the plaintiff's interests
to have as many § 1983 claims as possible against individual defendants to assure ultimate recovery.
155. 423 U.S. 362 (1976).
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court concluded that the supervisory defendants should be held responsible
because of their failure to act in the face of the "statistical" pattern of
misconduct. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed and the Supreme
Court reversed.
The Supreme Court's primary reason for reversal was the policy that
federal courts should avoid continuing intrusion of their equitable power
into the daily conduct of those in charge of state or local government
agency, unless there are extraordinary circumstances which justify the
intrusion. The Supreme Court appeared unimpressed that the number of
documented incidents showed an extraordinary pattern of misconduct
which would have justified injunctive relief. Beyond that, the Court was
troubled by the fact that plaintiffs had failed to show that the named
defendants were directly responsible for the misconduct. The plaintiffs'
theory was that defendants' failure to discipline incidents of police misconduct encouraged officers to continue their unconstitutional behavior.
The incidents were therefore likely to continue, not with respect to any
particular named plaintiff, but rather as to members of the class. The
plaintiffs' failure to establish a direct connection between the named
defendants' failure to discipline and the occurrence of the particular incidents proved fatal to their case. The Court appeared to require that the
plaintiffs demonstrate "an affirmative link," between the conduct of the
supervisors and the various incidents of police misconduct. The adoption
of a plan or policy s6 by defendants, express or otherwise, showing their
authorization or approval of such misconduct would apparently have
satisfied this requirement. Rizzo stands for the general proposition that
supervisory law enforcement officials, who have not directly participated
in the conduct which deprives an individual of constitutional rights, are
not liable in a section 1983 action unless the plaintiffs establish "an
affirmative link."
The perplexing problem is the composition of "an affirmative link."
In Rizzo itself, the Court considered failure to respond adequately to
incidents to be insufficient to establish the required link. The lower courts
156. The idea of a plan or policy foreshadows the Supreme Court's decision in Monell v. Dep't
of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), which held that municipalities are proper defendants under
a § 1983 claim so long as the constitutional deprivation is accomplished pursuant to a municipal
policy or usage. Because municipalities can carry out their activities only through the acts of their
employees, courts frequently premise municipal liability under § 1983 on the policies or usages of
the highest municipal employee responsible for the activity in which the abuse took place. For
example, if a city police chief established a policy requiring all suspects be subjected to strip and
body searches irrespective of the circumstances, proof of that policy presumably would be sufficient
to satisfy the "affirmative link" requirement of Rizzo. A person physically invaded by an individual
officer without justification could successfully impose liability on the police chief individually, despite
his lack of personal participation in the incident. Plaintiff would also have made out a case against
the municipality because of the existence of the unconstitutional policy. See supra text accompanying
notes 154-187.
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have fleshed out the "affirmative link" requirement, and often, although
not universally, have found that some form of negligence is sufficient to
satisfy the Rizzo formulation. For example, in McClelland v. Facteau,,'
the Tenth Circuit addressed the issue in a case where plaintiff was stopped
by a state police officer for speeding. Plaintiff refused to sign a traffic
citation and the officer locked Plaintiff in the police car. The policeman
than took the plaintiff to a city jail and booked him. Prior to his release,
the state police officer beat the plaintiff in the presence of the city jailer.
Plaintiff filed a section 1983 claim naming not only the individual officers
as defendants, but also the state chief of police and the city chief of
police.
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the police
chiefs because they had not personally participated in the misconduct.
The court of appeals reversed in part, recognizing that the "affirmative
link" requirement of Rizzo can be made out by failure to perform a duty
if the failure causes deprivation of constitutional rights. The court noted
that the Tenth Circuit had previously held that a complaint which alleged
that a police chief breached his duty adequately to train or supervise
personnel, and that his failure led to plaintiff's constitutional deprivation,
stated a section 1983 claim. 15 8 In McClelland,however, the plaintiff could
show only that an officer had violated a constitutional right on an isolated
occasion. The court held that the plaintiff's evidence was insufficient to
raise an issue of fact on adequacy of training. The court did not articulate
a legal standard. On the issue of supervision, however, the court acknowledged the existence of a negligence standard for section 1983 claims.
We agree with those courts that have found a cause of action under
section 1983 when the defendant was in a position of responsibility,
knew or should have known of the misconduct, and yet failed to act
157. 610 F.2d 693 (10th Cir. 1979).
158. See Dewell v. Lawson, 489 F.2d 877 (10th Cir. 1974).
159. McClelland v. Facteau is not universally read as stating a negligence standard on failure to
supervise. In Smith v. Hill, 510 F. Supp. 767 (D. Utah 1981), the district court relied on McClelland
in stating that "it is questionable whether simple negligence on the part of a defendant in a section
1983 suit could ever give rise to liability thereunder." Id. at 772. The author suggests that the Utah
court misunderstood McClelland. In McClelland, the court treated the issues of training and supervision separately. It decided that evidence of one isolated incident of misconduct was insufficient to
raise the issue of failure to train. This does not imply that the standard of care is other than
reasonableness in training. On the issue of supervision, the standard which the Tenth Circuit Court
of Appeals stated appears to be the classic statement of the negligence standard for nonfeasance.
Liability for negligence generally arises in the context of affirmative action. The defendant is deemed
culpable where he has acted and his acts do not conform to the standard of a reasonably prudent
man as judged against the community ideal of reasonable behavior. See Prosser, Law of Torts §§ 53,
54 (4th ed. 1964). The defendant is not usually held to be responsible for inaction. However, where
the defendant is under some affirmative duty to act and he fails to act accordingly, he may be held
responsible for his negligent omissions. He is responsible if his omission is unreasonable in light
of the circumstances. Byrd v. Brishke, 466 F.2d 6 (7th Cir. 1972).
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to prevent future harm. The standard to be applied is the conduct of

a reasonable person, under the circumstances, in the context of the
authority of each police chief and what he knew or should have
known. We find there is a genuine issue of fact whether defendants
breached this duty."
To establish a breach of the standard, the plaintiff must show that the
supervisory defendants had adequate notice of prior misbehavior of the
police officers and failed to respond. Adequate notice might be supplied
by publicity about abuses of these officers. This is not inconsistent with
Rizzo, because in Rizzo plaintiffs did not show that the supervisory defendants had knowledge of particular abuses by individual officers, nor
did he establish a pervasive pattern of unconstitutional police conduct.
In Withers v. Levine,"'6 the Fourth Circuit explained when negligence
is sufficient to state a section 1983 claim against supervisory prison personnel in the context of a case involving a fellow-inmate's sexual assault
upon plaintiff:
[Nlegligence by a state official under some circumstances may itself
violate a constitutionally protected right; when it does, it is actionable
under § 1983 ...
When there is present in a prison or in an identifiable portion of
it, a pervasive risk of harm to all prisoners, or to an identifiable
group of them, the constitutional prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment requires that prison officials exercise reasonable
care to provide reasonable protection from such unreasonable risk
of harm. Given the pervasive and unreasonable risk of harm, negligence by prison officials in their performance of their duty of care
is a violation of the constitutional right and actionable under § 1983.
The constitutional right would often remain unredressed if a higher
standard of care were required.' 62
In Wilcher v. Curley, 163 a federal district judge held that allegations
that a police commissioner knew that an officer had used excessive force
on numerous occasions prior to the incident of which plaintiff complained,
and that the commissioner failed to discipline the officer, thereby encouraging the officer to believe that he could use excessive force, was
sufficient to defeat defendant's motion for summary judgment. The court
held that section 1983 claims may be based on such negligent supervision.
Furthermore, evidence of the defendant's knowledge of an officer's rep160.
162.
162.
163.

610 F.2d at 697.
615 F.2d 158 (4th Cir. 1980).
Id.at 162.
519 F. Supp. 1 (D.Md. 1980).
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utation for bad temper may be the premise for a section 1983 supervisory
claim for negligent hiring. "
In all of these cases, the plaintiffs supplied the "affirmative link"
requirement of Rizzo by evidence of a causal connection between supervisory failures and the deprivation of plaintiff's constitutional rights. It
is obvious that the possibility of inconsistency exists between these decisions and Rizzo itself.
The Supreme Court has described Rizzo as though the case decided
that the mere right to control, without any control or direction having
been exercised, and without any failure to supervise is not enough to
support section 1983 liability. 6 5 The difficulty with that description is
that failure to exercise control in the light of known violations is precisely
what may be considered "failure to supervise." Failure to supervise which
causes constitutional violations is actionable under section 1983 in some
jurisdictions.' 6 6 The delicacy of the problem is illustrated by the very
indelicate case of Salinas v. Breier,'6 7 in which police officers subjected
plaintiffs to humiliating body searches. The court concluded that the police
chief's failure to establish a clear policy governing strip and body cavity
searches rendered him liable in a section 1983 action. It was precisely
the supervisor's failure to exercise control over his officers which made
him liable. The result in Salinas is hard to reconcile with the Rizzo dicta.
This difficulty, along with the reluctance of federal courts to permit
section 1983 to be used as a substitute for a simple tort claim, has
motivated some courts to reject mere negligence as the basis for a section
1983 action. In Owens v. Haas,16 the Second Circuit explained its standard in the analogous context of county liability.
The district court was correct in noting that a mere failure by the
county to supervise its employees would not be sufficient to hold it
liable under section 1983. Rizzo v. Goode .... However, the county
164. See, e.g., Brandon v. Allen, 516 F. Supp. 1355 (W.D. Tenn. 1981) (Supervisor had no
actual knowledge, but should have known, of officer's temper).
165. See Monell v. Dep't of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). "By our decision in Rizzo
v. Goode [citation omitted) we would appear to have decided that the mere right to control without
any control or direction having been exercised and without any failure to supervise is not enough
to support § 1983 liability." Id. at 694 n.58.
166. A number of cases have held that a failure to train, supervise or discipline subordinate
officers is actionable under § 1983. See, e.g., Owens v. Haas, 601 F.2d 1242 (2d Cir. 1979); Sims
v. Adams, 537 F.2d 829 (5th Cir. 1976); Wright v. McMann, 460 F.2d 126 (2d Cir. 1972), cert.
denied sub nom. McMann v. Wright, 409 U.S. 885 (1972). Cf. Maclin v. Paulson, 627 F.2d 83 (7th
Cir. 1980) (mere acquiescence by police chief when he is on notice of constitutional violations is
sufficient to trigger liability under § 1983).
167. 517 F. Supp. 1272 (E.D. Wis. 1981). See also Smith v. Jordan, 527 F. Supp. 167 (S.D.
Ohio 1981).
168. 601 F.2d 1242 (2d Cir. 1979).

38
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could be held liable if the failure to supervise or the lack of a proper
training program was so severe as to reach the level of "gross negligence" or "deliberate indifference" to the deprivation of the plaintiff's constitutional rights.

69

In Leite v. City of Providence,1 0 the court suggested that Rizzo demands
that the supervisory official act in some grossly negligent way as a condition to imposition of section 1983 liability. The Leite court acknowledged, however, that "Rizzo's authorization or approval" standards are
also satisfied when a supervisory official failed to act or acted inadequately
when he had actual or imputed knowledge of a past pattern of police
misconduct or knowledge of well-known incidents of police misconduct. '7 I
Recently, in Smith v. Hill'72 a federal district court court in Utah granted
the defendant county commissioners' motion to dismiss a section 1983
claim. The claim arose from an incident during which a county deputy
constable entered the plaintiff's house without a warrant, demanded immediate payment of a fine, and threatened to shoot the plaintiff. The
plaintiff's complaint against the commissioners alleged that the commissioners had a duty to supervise hiring of deputy constables and to insure
proper training. The plaintiff alleged a breach of these duties which
proximately caused a deprivation of plaintiff's civil rights. The court
explained that, in its view, the essential purpose of section 1983 is to
deter future constitutional violations rather than to compensate victims
of past abuse. Apparently the federal district court believed that "mere"
negligence is not susceptible to prophylaxis, but rather that potential
liability deters only "reckless or intentional" conduct. Accordingly, the
court required a showing that "defendant's conduct be reprehensible at
least to the degree of gross negligence or deliberate indifference to fundamental rights before liability under section 1983 may attach."' 73 The
court elaborated its understanding of "gross negligence" to imply an
extreme departure from the ordinary standard of care characterized by
conscious indifference to or reckless disregard of the rights of others.
The court also suggested a kind of sliding scale of supervisory liability:
"[Tihe more remote the actor is from the result, the greater must be his
intent in order for him to be liable under the act."' 74
169. Id. at 1246.
170. 463 F. Supp. 585 (D.R.I. 1978).
171. Id. at 590.
172. 510 F.Supp. 767 (D.Utah 1981).
173. Id. at 774.
174. Id. at 775. See also Vaughn v. Trotter, 516 F. Supp. 886 (M.D. Tenn. 1980). But see Carter
v. Carlson, 447 F.2d 358 (D.C. Cir. 1971), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. District of Columbia
v. Carter, 409 U.S. 418 (1973).
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The various conceptual contentions about the standards governing supervisory liability under section 1983 seem to be misdirected. There
appears to be total agreement that personal participation in the constitutional deprivation is not a requisite for supervisors to be liable under
section 1983.175 It also appears that the courts agree about when nonfeasance may be the basis of section 1983 liability: when the defendant
is in a position of responsibility which imposes a duty and when he has
knowledge (actual or constructive) of constitutional violations of his subordinates. Under those circumstances, the supervisor may be personally
liable if his inaction, i.e., his unreasonable failure to discipline or to train
is causally connected to the subordinate's violation of a person's constitutional rights. This is the classic statement of negligence in non-feasance
cases. To call this standard gross negligence or recklessness, as some
courts have done, simply distracts from the real question, whether the
interest which plaintiff alleges has been infringed is protected under the
Constitution. 176 If the supervisor's non-feasance under circumstances which
would ordinarily make non-feasance negligent increases the risk that
plaintiff's constitutional rights have been violated, then it should be actionable under section 1983.'
2. Governmental Entity Liability
a. Tort Claims Act
If a public employee commits a tort within the scope of his duties and
his conduct fits within one of the waivers of immunity contained in the
New Mexico Tort Claims Act, the governmental entity (either state agency
or local governmental body) which employs him is also liable. This
conclusion follows logically from the structure of the Act itself. It shields
both governmental entities and public employees from liability for torts
except as that immunity is waived in the Act.178 The waiver of immunities
175. Black v. Stephens, 662 F.2d 181 (3d Cir.1981); McClelland v. Facteau, 610 F.2d 693 (10th
Cir. 1979); Owens v. Haas, 601 F.2d 1242 (2d Cir. 1979); Bonner v. Coughlin, 545 F.2d 565 (7th
Cir. 1976).
176. To say that the distinction between negligence and gross negligence in § 1983 cases is
incorrect is not to say that it does not make a difference. Depending on the particular facts of a
case, it is possible that a court applying a simple negligence standard would reach different results
than would a court requiring gross negligence. For example, complaints are filed against a subordinate
officer. After each complaint is filed, the supervisor admonishes the officer to discontinue his behavior,
but does nothing else. The fourth occasion of misconduct gives rise to a § 1983 action. Other methods
of discipline are available, including discharge, suspension, transfer to other duties, and retraining.
On these facts, a court which adopts a negligence standard would permit a finding of supervisory
liability. Presumably a "gross negligence" court would require a few more instances of misconduct
to support supervisory liability.
177. See Bonner v. Coughlin, 545 F.2d 565 (7th Cir. 1976) (Swygert, J., dissenting).
178. N.M. Stat. Ann. §41-4-4(A) (Repl. Pamp. 1982).
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applies to certain acts of public employees, but the immunity waived is
that of both the public employee and the governmental entity for which
he works. " The Tort Claims Act itself provides that: "A governmental
entity shall pay any settlement or any final judgment entered against a
public employee." t"0 The Act includes both local public bodies and agencies and instrumentalities of the state.
b. Local Governmental Entities
The issue of liability of governmental entities is not so clear-cut under
section 1983.
For local governmental entities, there is a seminal case. In Monell v.
Department of Social Services,' 8 the United States Supreme Court held
that local governing bodies can be sued directly under section 1983 where
the allegedly unconstitutional action executes a policy or regulation officially adopted by the body's officials. An unconstitutional "custom or
usage" not formally adopted by the entity's official decision-making
mechanisms might also be the basis for governmental liability if executed
by an official whose action may be considered that of the entity. On the
other hand, the Supreme Court rejected governmental liability on the
basis of a respondeat superior theory:
[T]he language of § 1983, read against the background of the same
legislative history, compels the conclusion that Congress did not
intend municipalities to be held liable unless action pursuant to official municipal policy of some nature caused a constitutional tort.
In particular, we conclude that a municipality cannot be held liable
solely because it employs a tortfeasor--or, in other words, a municipality cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a respondeatsuperior
theory. 82
The difficult cases of governmental entity liability often present facts
which fall somewhere between formal policies and customs and mere
agency relationships. Frequently they also involve issues of supervisory
liability. In Black v. Stephens,t83 a jury founa that a police officer had
used excessive force against the plaintiff" 4 and that the chief of police
179. See N.M. Stat. Ann. § 41-4-3(B), (C), (G) (Repl. Pamp. 1982), for definitions of governmental entities.
180. N.M. Stat. Ann. §41-4-4(D) (Repl. Pamp. 1982). Interesting questions might arise because
of uncertainty about whether a particular organization is a governmental entity. These issues are
beyond the scope of this article.
181. 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
U.S.
182. Id. at 691. The Court reasserted this holding in 1981 in Polk County v. Dodson, 102 S.Ct. 445 (1981).
-,
183. 662 F.2d 181 (3d Cir. 1981).
184. The standard for excessive force in the case appeared to be force which "shocks the conscience." 662 F.2d at 188.
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had promulgated a regulation which proximately caused the police officer
to file unwarranted charges against the plaintiff. The regulation in question
was one which provided that if an officer made an arrest, no investigation
would be made of police misconduct until the arrest charges were finally
adjudicated. Plaintiff complained to the police chief about the officer's
conduct. The police chief told the officer about the complaint and thereafter the officer filed three additional charges against the plaintiff. Two
of the charges were subsequently dropped and the plaintiff was found not
guilty of the third charge. The court of appeals concluded that it was
reasonable for the jury to infer that the three additional charges were filed
in an effort to delay any disciplinary hearing on the incident involving
excessive force. The jury also found a connection between the police
chief's "policy" of promoting excessive force and the officer's misconduct. There was evidence that a citizen's complaint was never made a
part of an officer's permanent record. The police chief testified that the
officer probably would not have been promoted to detective if he had
been the type of officer who backed down. While characterizing the
evidence as "not overwhelming" on this issue, the court concluded that
the evidence was sufficient to make out both a policy of encouraging
excessive force and a connection between that policy and the officer's
use of excessive force on plaintiff.
Turning to the question of municipal liability, the court rejected the
city's contention that it was held liable merely because it employed an
employee who acted unconstitutionally. Instead, the court found that the
unconstitutional policy or custom is executed by one "whose edicts or
acts may fairly be said to represent official policy." 85 The chief of police
represents city policy because he is the final authority in charge of the
police force in the city. He is a "member of the Mayor's cabinet, prepares
and manages the budget and establishes policies and procedures for the
entire police department." 's6 The court noted that a sufficient basis for
municipal liability exists under section 1983 when an official whose actions may be considered to be those of the city violates the Constitution. 87
In Avery v. County of Burke,'8 8 the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals
described the contours of governmental liability under section 1983. Plaintiff, a fifteen-year-old, brought the action against a county and several
individuals alleging that the individuals wrongfully caused her to be
185. Id. at 191.
186. Id.
187. Cf. McLaughlin v. City of La Grange, 662 F.2d 1385 (11th Cir. 1981). In McLaughlin,
after the plaintiffs filed excessive force complaints with the chief of police, he investigated, notified
the officer who had violated rules and then fired the officer. The police chief's and city's motion
for summary judgment was granted and affirmed.
188. 660 F.2d Ill (4th Cir. 1981).
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sterilized after informing her she had sickle cell trait. She contended that
she was wrongfully sterilized because she did not have the trait and
because sterilization is not medically appropriate even when the trait is
properly diagnosed. The district court granted the county's motion for
summary judgment, finding insufficient evidence to establish a policy,
custom, pattern, or tacit authorization sufficient to impose liability on the
county under section 1983. In reversing the summary judgment, the court
of appeals said:
The county

. . .

may be liable under § 1983 if their policies and

customs actually caused Avery's injuries. [citation omitted]. Avery
need not prove, however, that members of the boards personally
participated in or expressly authorized, her sterilization. [citation
omitted]. Official policy may be established by omissions of supervisory officials as well as from their affirmative acts ....

Thus, the

conduct of the boards may be actionable if their failure to promulgate
policies and regulations rose to the level of deliberate indifference
procreation or constituted tacit authorization of
to Avery's right of
89
her sterilization. 1

From these cases, it appears that the lower federal courts are developing
liability standards for local governmental entities similar to those announced for supervisory officials. '9 It is clear that parallel standards are
desirable because a governmental entity can only act through the acts of
its employees. The entity can deprive an individual of constitutionally
secured rights only through the conduct of natural persons. If there is an
"affirmative link" between a governmental employee's conduct and the
deprivation, and if that person, because of his position, can be considered
to act as the entity, then both the supervisor and the governmental entity
are liable under section 1983.t91
c. The State
The section 1983 liability of the state as an entity is hotly contested.' 92
189. Id. at 114.
190. See supra text accompanying notes 154-177. As with the issue of supervisory liability, the
allegation of a single incident of unconstitutional conduct by a municipal employee is not sufficient
for municipal liability, but a pattern of misconduct will raise an inference of municipal liability. See,
e.g., Powe v. City of Chicago, 664 F.2d 639 (7th Cir. 1981). Although standards for municipal and
supervisory liability are parallel, it is clear that the defenses are not. A city does not share in the
qualified immunity that its officers have. Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622 (1980).
191. See, e.g., McGhee v. Draper, 639 F.2d 639 (10th Cir. 1981); Turpin v. Mailet, 619 F.2d
196 (2d Cir. 1980); Schneider v. City of Atlanta, 628 F.2d 915 (5th Cir. 1980).
192. If a § 1983 claim against a state is litigated in federal court, the eleventh amendment is the
limiting factor because it deprives federal courts of jurisdiction over actions where states are defendants. The eleventh amendment and federal judicial jurisdiction is beyond the scope of this article.
Excellent surveys of the operation of the eleventh amendment are Field, Eleventh Amendment and
Other Sovereign Immunity Doctrines, 126 U. Pa. L. Rev. 515-549,1203-1280(1978), and Thornton,
Eleventh Amendment: An EndangeredSpecies, 55 Ind. L.J. 293 (1979-80).
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' Justice Rehnquist explained for the majority of
In Quern v. Jordan,93
the Court that section 1983 is no exception to the immunity of states in
federal court afforded by the eleventh amendment of the United States
Constitution. The majority did not address the question whether a state
is a "person" within the meaning of section 1983. The issue is significant
because if the state is not a proper defendant within the meaning of section
1983, then, even if a state has otherwise waived its eleventh amendment
immunity, it could not be sued under section 1983 in federal court.
Further, if that interpretation of section 1983 prevails, then a state could
not be a defendant in a section 1983 action in state court even though
the eleventh amendment has no applicability to state judicial jurisdiction.
Justice Brennan, in his dissent in Quern, saw the question to be whether
the word "person" as used in section 1983 was intended to cover states.
According to the Quern dissent, but not according to the majority, the
holding of the case is that a state is not a "person" within the meaning
of section 1983. Because the holding of Quern is so murky, it is not
surprising to find disagreement on the point in the lower federal courts
and state courts. Courts in Alaska 94 and Washington 9 5 have interpreted
section 1983 to exclude states as proper defendants. Federal district judges
in Montana' 9 6 and Nevada' 97 have concluded that Quern requires dismissal
of section 1983 claims against the state not only because of the eleventh
amendment, but also because states are not persons under section 1983.
There is equal authority for the proposition that states and their departments and agencies are "persons" and can be defendants in section
' the court accepted the
1983 actions. In Marrapese v. Rhode Island,98
interpretation of section 1983 which gives greatest latitude to its broad
remedial purposes. The court concluded that states are "persons," but
because of the eleventh amendment, each state must consent to the imposition of section 1983 liability in federal court: "This interpretation
allows victims of unconstitutional activity the largest possibility for redress, while exacting little cost in terms of federalism.' 99 Other federal
district courts have reached the same conclusion. 2" The legislative history
of section 1983, so exhaustively recounted in Monell, appears to be in
193. 440 U.S. 332 (1979).
194. Alaska v. Green, 633 P.2d 1381 (Alaska 1981). In DeVargas v. New Mexico, 97 N.M. 450,
640 P.2d 1327 (Ct. App. 1981), the New Mexico Court of Appeals said in dicta that: "The State
and its Department of Corrections are not persons within the meaning of § 1983." Id. at 452, 640
P.2d at 1329.
195. Edgar v. Washington, 92 Wash. 2d 217, 595 P.2d 534 (1979).
196. Holladay v. Montana, 506 F. Supp. 1317 (D.Mont. 1981).
197. O'Connor v. Nevada, 507 F. Supp. 546 (D.Nev. 1981).
198. 500 F. Supp. 1207 (D.R.I. 1980).
199. Id. at 1212.
200. See, e.g., Harris v. Bd. of Regents, 528 F. Supp. 987 (D.Ariz. 1981); Irwin v. Calhoun,
522 F. Supp. 576 (D.Mass. 1981); Morrow v. Sudler, 502 F. Supp. 1200 (D.Colo. 1980) (citing
for the proposition Brogan v. Wiggins School District, 588 F.2d 409 (10th Cir. 1978)).
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harmony with the Marrapese interpretation. "In both Houses, statements
of the supporters of § 1 [predecessor to 42 U.S.C. § 1983] corroborated
that Congress, in enacting section 1, intended to give a broad remedy
for violations of federally protected civil rights." 20 ' Nevertheless, consistency has not been the hallmark of the United States Supreme Court
section 1983 decisions, so it is difficult to predict how the Court will
treat this issue when it chooses to address it.
201. Monell v. Dep't of Social Services, 436 U.S. at 685. The Court continued:
Representative Bingham, the author of § I of the Fourteenth Amendment,
for example, declared the bill's purpose to be "the enforcement . . . of the
Constitution on behalf of every individual citizen of the Republic . . . to the
extent of the rights guarantied [sic] to him by the Constitution." Globe App.
81. He continued:
"The States never had the right, though they had the power, to inflict wrongs
upon free citizens by a denial of the full protection of the laws. . . . [And] the
States did deny to citizens the equal protection of the laws, they did deny the
rights of citizens under the Constitution, and except to the extent of the express
limitations upon the States, as I have shown, the citizen had no remedy ...
They took property without compensation, and he had no remedy. They restricted the freedom of the press, and he had no remedy. They restricted the
freedom of speech, and he had no remedy. They restricted the rights of conscience, and he had no remedy. . . . Who dare say, now that the Constitution
has been amended, that the nation cannot by law provide against all such abuses
and denials of right as these in the States and by States, or combinations of
persons?" Id., at 85.
Representative Perry . . . also stated:

"Now, by our action on this bill we have asserted as fully as we can assert
the mischief intended to be remedied. We have asserted as clearly as we can
assert our belief that it is the duty of Congress to redress that mischief. We
have also asserted as fully as we can assert the constitutional right of Congress
to legislate." Globe 800.
Other supporters were quite clear that § I of the Act extended a remedy not
only where a State had passed an unconstitutional statute, but also where officers
of the State were deliberately indifferent to the rights of black citizens:
Importantly for our inquiry, even the opponents of § I agreed that it was
constitutional and, further, that it swept very broadly. Thus, Senator Thurman,
who gave the most exhaustive critique of § 1, said:
"This section relates wholly to civil suits ....
Its whole effect is to give to
the Federal Judiciary that which now does not belong to it-a jurisdiction that
may be constitutionallv conferred upon it, I grant, but that has never yet been
conferred upon it. It authorizes any person who is deprived of any right,
privilege, or immunity secured to him by the Constitution of the United States,
to bring an action against the wrongdoer in the Federal courts, and that without
any limit whatsoever as to the amount in controversy. ...
"[There is no limitation whatsoever upon the terms that are employed [in
the bill], and they are as comprehensive as can be used." Globe App. 216217 (emphasis added).
436 U.S. at 685-686 n.45 (1978).
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3. Statute of Limitations
The New Mexico Tort Claims Act clearly spells out the limitations
period for torts committed by public employees within the scope of their
employment:
Actions against a governmental entity or a public employee for
torts shall be forever barred unless such action is commenced within
two years after the date of occurrence resulting in loss, injury or
death, except that a minor under the full age of seven years shall
have until his ninth birthday in which to file. ....
This has caused relatively little difficulty when the actionable conduct is
a tort for which the state has waived immunity under The Act. Limitations
questions are seriously contended when the conduct is a constitutional
deprivation, however.23 Two cases illustrate the controversy. In Gunther
v. Miller,2" the plaintiff brought a section 1983 action against a city, its
chief of police, and one of its police officers. The plaintiff claimed that
the police used excessive force in her arrest. The defendants argued that
the two-year statute of limitations contained in the Tort Claims Act
controlled. Plaintiff asserted that either a three-year period for personal
injuries or a four-year period for miscellaneous claims was appropriate.
The court explained that in the absence of a federal statute of limitations
governing section 1983 claims, the statute of limitations for the most
clearly analogous state cause of action should be applied. The court
concluded that the general limitations period established by New Mexico
law should apply. It reasoned that a section 1983 claim is not analogous
to a cause of action brought under a state tort claims act, "because tort
claims acts are based on 'state concepts of sovereign immunity alien to
the purpose to be served by the Civil Rights Act.' "25
The New Mexico state courts do not agree. In DeVargas v. New Mexico,
in a brief opinion accompanying an order to quash a petition for certiorari,
the New Mexico Supreme Court said, "under New Mexico law, the most
closely analogous state cause of action [to section 1983] is provided for
202. N.M. Stat. Ann. §41-4-15(A) (Repl. Pamp. 1982).
203. Arguably the two-year period in the Act applies only to torts and not to constitutional
deprivations. The provision addresses only torts. Elsewhere the Act draws a distinction between torts
and constitutional violations. See N.M. Stat. Ann. §§41-4-4(B), 41-4-12 (Repl. Pamp. 1982). If
the legislature had intended that the two-year period apply to both torts and constitutional violations,
it would expressly have said so.
204. 498 F. Supp. 882 (D.N.M. 1980).
205. Id.at 883.
206. 97 N.M. 563, 642 P.2d 166 (1982).

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 13

by the New Mexico Tort Claims Act ...."207 The court of appeals opinion
in DeVargas2 gave a more elaborate description of the analogy:
Section 1983 provides liability for the deprivation of any rights,
privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws of the
United States. Section 41-4-12 . . .provides for liability (by a waiver
of immunity) for a deprivation of any rights, privileges or immunities
secured by the court and laws of the United States. Liability under
§ 1983 and 41-4-12 ...is consistent, not inconsistent.2°

Section 1983 does not contain a statute of limitations, but in 42 U.S.C.
§ 1988, Congress instructs federal courts to refer to state statutes when
federal law provides no rule of decision. 2" Federal courts may disregard
an otherwise applicable state rule of law only if the state law is inconsistent
212
with the Constitution and federal law. 21 ' In Board ofRegents v. Tomanio,
the United States Supreme Court specifically held that a New York statute
of limitations and its associated tolling rules applied to a section 1983
action saying "the controlling period 21would
ordinarily be the most ap3
propriate one provided by state law."
The overarching question, however, is which state statute of limitations
is most appropriately applied to section 1983 actions. 214 The determination
of that question is a matter of federal law. 215 Different courts have reached
disparate conclusions largely because of the great variety of limitations
patterns found from state to state. Generalizations are therefore perilous.
Nevertheless, some patterns seem to emerge. In states which have a
limitation period for actions "created by statute," the courts consider that
limitation period appropriate for section 1983, a statutory liability ac207.
208.
209.
210.

Id. at 564, 642 P.2d at 167.
97 N.M. 450, 640 P.2d 1327 (Ct. App. 1981).
Id. at 454, 640 P.2d at 1331.
42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976), provides in part:
The jurisdiction . . . for the protection of all persons in the United States in
their civil rights, and for their vindication, shall be exercised and enforced in
conformity with the laws of the United States. . . ;but in all cases where they
•..are deficient in the provisions necessary to furnish suitable remedies...
the common law, as modified and changed by the constitution and statutes of
the State where in the court having jurisdiction . ..is held, so far as the same
is not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States ...
211. Robertson v. Wegmann, 436 U.S. 584 (1978); Occidental Life Insurance Co. v. E.E.O.C.,
432 U.S. 355 (1977).
212. 446 U.S. 478 (1980).
213. Id. at 485 (quoting Johnson v. Ry. Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454 (1975)).
214. In New Mexico there are three possibilities. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 41-4-15 (Repl. Pamp. 1982)
(2 years under the Tort Claims Act); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 37-1-8 (1978) (3 years for injury to the
person); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 37-1-4 (1978) (4 years for actions not otherwise provided for).
215. U.A.W. v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696 (1966); see also Pauk v. Bd. of Trustees,
654 F.2d 856 (2d Cir. 1981).
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tion.21 6 The Second Circuit specifically rejected a shorter limitations period contained in a statute governing municipal and municipal employer
liability, partly because the shorter period would not be consistent with
the broad remedial purposes of section 1983.217 The Ninth Circuit has
consistently characterized section 1983 claims as actions created by statute, but was unable to use that principle in Rose v. Rinaldi,2" 8 a case
arising in Washington which had no such statutory period. The Rinaldi
court examined Washington's other statutes of limitations and selected
the statute governing injury to the person, a three-year statute. The court
said that "in section 1983 actions the United States has an interest in a
limitations period 'sufficiently generous . . .to preserve the remedial
spirit of federal civil rights actions.' "219
In Beard v. Robinson,2"' the Seventh Circuit explained its choice of a
period applying to causes of action created by statute:
We believe our choice .. .is compelled by the fundamental differences between a civil rights action and a common law tort. The
Civil Rights Acts do not create "a body of general federal tort law."
Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701, 96 S.Ct. 1155, 1160, 47 L.Ed.2d
405 (1976). Rather, they "creat[e] rights and impos[e] obligations
different from any which would exist at common law in the absence
of statute. A given state of facts may of course give rise to a cause
of action in common-law tort as well as to a cause of action under
Section 1983, but the elements of the two are not the same. The
elements of an action under Section 1983 are (1) the denial under
color of state law (2) of a right secured by the Constitution and laws
of the United States. Neither of these elements would be required
to make out a cause of action in common-law tort; both might be
present without creating common-law tort liability." Smith v. Cremins, 308 F.2d 187, 190 (9th Cir. 1962).21
In Schorle v. City of Greenhills,222 the court rejected a one-year tort
limitation in favor of a four-year period applicable to injuries to rights
of plaintiff not arising on contract or out of tort. The court reasoned that
216. See, e.g., Pauk v. Bd. of Trustees, 654 F.2d 856 (2d Cir. 1981); Berry v. Battey, 666 F.2d
1183 (8th Cir. 1981); Bratton v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 649 F.2d 658 (9th Cir. 1980); Beard v.
Robinson, 563 F.2d 331 (7th Cir. 1977) cert. denied sub nom. Mitchell v. Beard. 438 U.S. 907
(1978); Ganther v. Bd. of Regents, 127 Ariz. 57, 617 P.2d 1173 (Ct. App. 1980).
217. Pauk v. Bd. of Trustees, 654 F.2d 856, 862 (2d Cir. 1981); see also Childers v. Indep.
School Dist. No. 1, 676 F.2d 1338 (10th Cir. 1982).
218. 654 F.2d 546 (9th Cir. 1981).
219. Id. at 547 (quoting Shouse v. Pierce County, 559 F.2d 1142 (9th Cir. 1977)).
220. 563 F.2d 331 (7th Cir. 1977) cert. deniedsub nora., Mitchell v. Beard, 438 U.S. 907 (1978).
221. Id. at 336-37.
222. 524 F Supp. 821 (S.D. Ohio 1981).
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a well-pleaded cause of action under section 1983 always states a cause
of action broader than one for a simple common law tort.

In Kosikowski v. Bourne,223 however, the Ninth Circuit held that the

proper limitations period controlling that case was the two-year limitation
contained in the Oregon Tort Claims Act rather than the two-year period
in the Oregon general torts limitation statute or the six-year statute of
limitations for causes of action created by statute. The court felt compelled
to so hold because of specific language in the Oregon Tort Claims Act.
In 1977, the Oregon Legislature again amended Or. Rev. Stat.
§ 30.265(1), changing the last sentence of the subsection to provide
that "[a]s used in ORS 30.260 to 30.300, 'tort' includes any violation
of 42 U.S.C. section 1983." (Emphasis added.) By applying the
provisions of Or. Rev. Stat. § 30.265 to 30.300 to § 1983 actions,
the 1977 amendments made applicable the Or. Rev. Stat. § 30.275(3)
two-year statute of limitations to § 1"983 actions. This was not inadvertent. The legislative history of the 1977 amendment demonstrates that the Oregon Legislature intended to amend Or. Rev. Stat.
§ 30.265(1) to insure that the two-year statute of limitations applied
to § 1983 actions. See Minutes of House Committee on Judiciary,
May 24, 1977, 59th Oregon Legislative Assembly 4 (1977).
This precise expression of the intent of the Oregon Legislature
makes unnecessary a resort to a characterization of appellants' cause
of action in the manner employed by this court in Clark v. Musick,
623 F.2d 89 (9th Cir. 1980). Such characterization serves no purpose
other than to provide guidance in the selection of the applicable state
statute. When the state has expressly made that selection the federal
courts should accept it unless to do so would frustrate the purposes
22 14
served by the federal law upon which the plaintiff's claims rest.
223. 659 F.2d 105 (9th Cir. 1981).
224. Id. at 107. The extent to which a federal court must defer to a state's legislative designation
of a period of limitations for a federal claim appears to be unsettled. In Johnson v. Ry. Express
Agency, 421 U.S. 454 (1975), a Tennessee statute designating a one-year limitation period for actions
brought under the federal civil rights statutes was found to apply to a claim brought under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981 (1976). The Supreme Court's grant of the petition for certiorari, however, was limited, and
did not include the question of whether the district court had selected the state period of limitations
most appropriate for a § 1981 claim. Indeed, the Court made clear that it had not reached the question
of whether a state's legislative designation of a period for a federal claim binds a federal court to
conclude that the designated period is the most appropriate period.
Our limited grant of certiorari foreclosed our considering whether some other
Tennessee statute, such as Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-309 (1955) (six years for an
action on a contract) or § 28-310 (1955) (10 years on an action not otherwise
provided for), might be the appropriate one. We also have no occasion to
consider whether Tennessee's express application of the one-year limitation
period to federal civil rights actions is an impermissible discrimination against
the federal cause of action [citation omitted] or whether the enactment of the
limitation period after the cause of action accrued [citation omitted] did not
touch the pre-existing federal claim.
Id. at 462 n.7.
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Except when a state statute specifically provides a civil rights limitation,
the choice of the most appropriate period of limitations for section 1983
actions appears, then, to be influenced by three considerations. First, to
the extent possible, the courts try to achieve uniformity as to the period
within the state.22 A section 1983 police misconduct case ought not to
be governed by a different period of limitations than a case involving
termination of public employment without an adequate hearing. This
explains the preference for a period of limitations set out in a general
provision, such as those which apply to causes of action created by statute,
rather than a more specifically enumerated period available in a state
code. Second, courts consider that the broad remedial purposes of section
1983 should not be undermined by the choice of the period. This consideration does seem to influence courts to choose a longer period where
that is plausible. Finally, most courts have noted that a constitutional
violation is distinct from a tort. Therefore, the statute of limitations
applicable to torts is not necessarily the most appropriate limitation for
section 1983 actions, which, of course, redress constitutional violations
and not mere torts.
Application of these principles should result in rejection of the twoyear period under the Tort Claims Act period as the most appropriate limit
for section 1983 actions in New Mexico. The only large group of cases
governed by the Tort Claims Act which may also present section 1983
claims are claims against law enforcement officers.22 6 One can imagine
a whole array of section 1983 claims for which there are simply no
analogies under the Tort Claims Act. For those claims the courts would
have to consider other statutes of limitations, and uniformity would be
disserved. Both of the other statutes of limitations which are plausibly
More recently, in the context of a claim under § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29
U.S.C. § 301 (1976), the United States Supreme Court said:
"[The timeliness of a § 301 suit ... is to be determined, as a matter of federal
law, by reference to the appropriate state statute of limitations." [quoting Auto
Workers v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696, 704-705 (1966)]. Our
present task is to determine which limitations period is "the most appropriate
one provided by state law." [Citation omitted]. This depends upon an examination of the nature of the federal claim and the federal policies involved.
United Parcel Serv. Inc. v. Mitchell, 451 U.S. 56, 60-61 (1981).
But in Spiegel v. School Dist. No. 1, 600 F.2d 264 (10th Cir. 1979), a § 1983 case, the court
approved the trial court's application of a Wyoming statute expressly providing a two-year period
for all actions upon a liability created by a federal statute, without analyzing whether another period
might be more appropriate in light of the federal policies involved in the claim or discussing the
extent of deference owed to a state's express legislative designation of the period for a federal claim.
225. The § 1983 limitation period, of course, is not uniform nationally. Because § 1988 directs
federal courts to apply state law where federal law is deficient, national uniformity would be an
impossibility.
226. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 41-4-12 (Repl. Pamp. 1982). This waiver of immunity expressly covers
constitutional violations as well as torts. The Tort Claims Act period of limitations by its own terms
applies only to torts.
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applicable to section 1983 actions provide longer periods than does the
Tort Claims Act.227 Therefore, choice of the Tort Claims Act limitations
appears inconsistent with the goals of section 1983, particularly because
the legislative purpose expressed in the Tort Claims Act is to limit governmental liability.228 Further, in Wells v. County of Valencia,229 the New
Mexico Supreme Court recognized the distinction between a constitutional
violation and a tort. Indeed, the court pointed out the legislative distinctions drawn between them in the Tort Claims Act itself.2 3 ° Acceptance of
the Tort Claims Act limitations period as the one most analogous to section
1983 would blur the distinction between torts and constitutional violations
and would be inconsistent with Wells as well.
IV. CONCLUSION
One theme persists throughout the inquiry into the impact of state tort
law on section 1983 actions. It also appears in the overlap and coexistence
of section 1983 claims and New Mexico tort claims. Constitutional tort
claims and state tort claims are different from one another even though
the same conduct may give rise. to both kinds of claims.
The distinction between the claims flows ineluctably from the different
interests which they protect. Section 1983 provides a remedy for an
individual who has been abused by his state or local government acting
through its officials. The precise goal of the Civil Rights Act is to protect
the individual from his government.
State tort law, on the other hand, is designed primarily to shift the loss
of an injury to the person whose conduct causes the harm. Abusiveness
is not the standard used for shifting the loss. Conduct which departs from
a community standard of reasonableness is sufficient. If the person who
causes the harm is a governmental employee, the interest in protecting
both the process of governing and public treasuries competes with the
loss shifting interest. In New Mexico, the balance between these interests
has been struck in favor of the government. Except as provided in the
waivers, the Tort Claims Act protects the government from liability to
individuals. Obviously, then, the thrust of state tort law, with its immunity
doctrines, is in direct opposition to the purposes of section 1983.
To say that there is a difference between constitutional torts and state
torts is not to deny that courts have decided state tort law has impact on
227. See supra note 214.
228. The whole structure of The Act is a limitation. It confers blanket immunity, and then makes
exceptions from the blanket. There is a limitation on liability even where immunity is waived.
229. - N.M. -_,644 P.2d 517 (1982).
644 P.2d at 520.
230. Id. at -,
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section 1983 claims in a variety of ways. This is true largely because of
the lack of detail in the federal law. For example, section 1983 is silent
on defenses. It would have been possible to conclude, as a matter of
statutory construction, that the silence of Congress was purposive and
that no defenses were to be recognized to deprivations of constitutional
rights. Instead the Supreme Court, in Scheuer v. Rhodes,2"3' chose to
examine the meaning of section 1983 against a general background of
tort law and concluded that members of the executive branch of government who acted in good faith were not liable even though their conduct
results in a constitutional deprivation. Section 1988 of the Civil Rights
Act specifically addresses the problem of deficiency in section 1983, and
requires federal courts to look to state law for rules of decision provided
such state law is not inconsistent with the purposes of the federal law.
Given this pre-existing pattern of looking to state law to fill in the
silence of the federal civil rights act contained in section 1983, it is not
surprising that courts have looked to state tort law for guidance on the
most fundamental question-the very existence of a constitutional claim.
Surely Ingraham v. Wright,2 32 and Parrattv. Taylor,2 33 point in that direction. But to the extent that they suggest that the existence of a state
tort remedy precludes a section 1983 action, they are misguided. A careful
inquiry must be made into the nature of the governmental action. If the
action deprives an individual of an incorporated right, or is irrational and
arbitrary, or is likely to unjustifiably intrude into an individual's personal
integrity or property rights through a misuse of power, a section 1983
claim is stated. With apologies to Monroe v. Pape,234 if there is a state
tort remedy available, it is supplementary to the federal remedy. It should
not supplant it. If the governmental action is not abusive in the sense
stated above, then no section 1983 claim is stated. If state tort law provides
redress for the conduct of a governmental employee which causes a loss,
the injured individual's interest in shifting his loss will be served. If state
immunity doctrine prevents the loss from being shifted, the interest in
protecting governing and governments will be served. But in no event
should a section 1983 claim be available just because no state tort remedy
is available to redress an individual's loss if there is no constitutional
deprivation. With respect to the existence of claims, section 1983 and
state tort law should operate fully in their respective spheres, thereby best
serving the interests they were designed to promote. Only by being con231.
232.
233.
234.

416
430
451
365

U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.

232
651
527
167

(1974).
(1977). See supra notes 69-104 and accompanying text.
(1981). See supra notes 70-104 and accompanying text.
(1961). See supra notes 10-12 and accompanying text.
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sistently mindful of the difference between constitutional deprivations and
ordinary torts can courts do service to both the protection of the individual
mandated by the federal constitution and implemented through section
1983 and the protection of state and local governments reflected in state
tort law and immunity doctrines.

